tags:

• sentence-transformers
• sentence-similarity
• feature-extraction
• generated_from_trainer
• dataset_size:248554
• loss:CachedMultipleNegativesRankingLoss base_model: answerdotai/ModernBERT-base widget:
• source_sentence: What are the duties of a city treasurer with respect to funds collected for licensing? sentences:

  • 'Dennis BRUWELHEIDE, Appellant, v. James GARVEY, et al., Respondents.

    No. C8-90-1320.

    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

    Jan. 22, 1991.

    Review Denied March 15, 1991.

    Thomas R. Hughes, St. Paul, for appellant.

    Eric J. Magnuson, Mary E. Pawlenty, Rider, Bennett, Egan & Arundel, Minneapolis, for respondents.

    Considered and decided by KALITOWSKI, P.J., and FOLEY and NORTON, JJ.

    OPINION

    FOLEY, Judge.

    Appellant Dennis Bruwelheide challenges the trial court’s reduction of a jury award for his past wage loss by the amount of his paid sick leave as a collateral source under Minn.Stat. § 548.36 (1988). We reverse.

    FACTS

    Bruwelheide was injured when he tripped over logs that had piled up on a sidewalk in front of respondents James and Pamela Garvey’s property. As a result, Bruwel-heide lost 47 days of work. During this time, he received $5,602 sick leave pay from his employer.

    Bruwelheide sued the Garveys for personal injury, alleging they were causally negligent in allowing logs to obstruct the sidewalk. The jury returned a special verdict finding the Garveys 90% at fault. The jury found Bruwelheide’s past wage loss to be $7,000, but the trial court deducted $5,602 sick leave pay as a collateral source under Minn.Stat. § 548.36. Bruwelheide challenges this reduction.

    ISSUE

    Did the trial court err by applying Minn. Stat. § 548.36 to sick leave that may be accumulated and cashed-out at retirement?

    ANALYSIS

    The parties dispute whether sick leave pay is a collateral source. This issue appears to be a case of first impression in Minnesota.

    Bruwelheide maintains the collateral source statute does not apply to his sick leave benefits because he would not get a double recovery. He argues the reduction deprives him of paid sick leave that he may need in the future or that could be accumulated and cashed-out at retirement.

    The Garveys contend the trial court properly deducted Bruwelheide’s sick leave. They maintain the sick leave pay is a collateral source because it constitutes wages paid by Bruwelheide’s employer when he was disabled.

    Minn.Stat. § 548.36, subd. 2 provides:

    In a civil action * * * when liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact, and when damages include an award to compensate the plaintiff for losses available to the date of the verdict by collateral sources, a party may file a motion * * * requesting determination of collateral sources. * * * the court shall determine:

    (1) amounts of collateral sources that have been paid for the benefit of the plaintiff or are otherwise available to the plaintiff as a result of losses * * *;

    Minn.Stat. § 548.36, subd. 1 defines collateral sources as

    payments related to the injury or disability in question made to the plaintiff, or on the plaintiffs behalf up to the date of the verdict, by or pursuant to:

    ---

    (4) a contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers *

    • • to provide wages during a period of disability, except benefits received from a private disability insurance policy where the premiums were wholly paid for by the plaintiff.

    The collateral source statute was enacted in 1986 to partially abrogate a plaintiffs common law right to be overcompensated, to prevent double recoveries and to lower insurance premiums by deducting certain benefits received by a plaintiff. Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal, 453 N.W.2d 326, 331-332 (Minn.1990). Previously, common law provided that a damage award could not be reduced by compensation received from sources other than the defendant. Id. (citing Hueper v. Goodrich, 314 N.W.2d 828, 830 (Minn.1982)). However, the purpose of the collateral source statute is to keep a plaintiff from receiving a windfall at the tortfeasor’s expense. Johnson v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 608, 614 (Minn.1988). Our task in interpreting the statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Minn.Stat. § 645.08 (1988).

    Minn.Stat. § 548.36, subd. 1(4) specifically refers to disability pay rather than sick leave pay. A distinction can be drawn between the two. Disability pay is usually calculated from the amount of a yearly salary. It does not increase, unless the overall salary increases.

    However, sick leave pay is calculated from the amount of time worked. Here, Bruwelheide is given bonus sick leave if he does not use the days to which he is entitled and he can exchange them for cash. This differs from disability pay. When a person retires, he usually is not entitled to a percentage of his salary if he has not used disability benefits. The benefits are foregone.

    The statute also specifies a wage continuation plan, not sick leave. When sick leave can be cashed-out on retirement, it is not a wage continuation plan, but a benefit.

    We find the sick leave pay in this case is not encompassed by the language of Minn.Stat. § 548.36. Therefore, the analysis used under the common law rule is instructive. For example, sick leave paid by an employer does not reduce a plaintiff’s recovery. Payne v. Bilco Co., 54 Wis.2d 424, 433, 195 N.W.2d 641, 647 (1972). The right to payment for sick leave is earned as part of the employee’s compensation. Cincinnati Bell, Inc. v. Hinterlong, 70 Ohio Misc. 38, 47-8, 437 N.E.2d 11, 17 (1981) (citing Rigney v. Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 99 Ohio App. 105, 112, 131 N.E.2d 413, 417 (1954)). A plaintiff is entitled to compensation if he is forced to use his sick leave as a result of the defendant’s negligence. Cincinnati Bell, 70 Ohio Misc, at 47-8, 437 N.E.2d at 17; see also Annotation, Receipt of Compensation From Consumption of Accumulated Employment Leave, Vacation Time, Sick Leave Allowance or the Like as Affecting Recovery Against Tortfeasor, 52 A.L.R.2d 1443 (1957). If the plaintiff makes advantageous employment arrangements for sick leave benefits, it is not a collateral source. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A comment b (1979).

    Bruwelheide’s arrangement with his employer provided that he earned five hours of sick leave benefits for each month of service. If he did not use his sick leave benefits each month, he received an extra seven hours of sick leave benefits in reserve each month. The benefits could be used for injury, illness and child care, or, when Bruwelheide retired, he would be entitled to be paid in cash for any sick leave that had accumulated.

    Because Bruwelheide can cash-out his sick leave at retirement, he had a financial interest in this benefit. The cash-out provision was the employer’s incentive to its employees not to use sick leave. However, when Bruwelheide used his sick leave benefits in recovering from his injuries, he diminished the sick leave available for future injury, illness and child care or to cash-out on retirement.

    Bruwelheide also asserts that, if sick leave pay is a collateral source under Minnesota statutes, then Minn.Stat. § 548.36 is unconstitutional. Because we hold Bruwelheide’s sick leave pay is not a collateral source under Minn.Stat. § 548.36, we do not reach this question.

    DECISION

    Bruwelheide’s sick leave pay does not give him double recovery. He earned the right to payment as a part of his employee compensation, is entitled to it, and should not be forced to forego this benefit. We hold Bruwelheide’s recovery should not be diminished by the amount of sick leave paid to him.

    Reversed.'

  • 'City of Winona vs. William J. Whipple and others.

    August 11, 1877.

    Statute — Construction—When Words will be Substituted. — By Sp. Laws 1875, e. 13, § 1, it is enacted “ that § 2 of c. 1, of e. 20, Sp. Laws 1867 be amended so that the proviso at the end of the first subdivision shall read as follows: “Provided, the chy council,” etc., etc. Section 2 of c. 1, of said c. 20, contains no subdivisions or provisos, and the amendment attempted by e. 13, Sp. Laws 1875, is in no way germane to that section. Section 2 of c. 4, of said c. 20, contains subdivisions and a proviso at the end of the first subdivision, and to that subdivision the amendment mentioned is entirely appropriate, and to no other part of said c. 20. Held, that to carry out the manifest intention of the legislature, said c. 13 is to be read by substituting, in the passage above quoted, “c. 4” for “ c. 1. ”

    City Charter — When the Legislature may Amend — Amendment Construed— Power to License Sale of Intoxicating Liquors is a Delegated Police Power.— The amendment before mentioned, as enacted by e. 13, Sp. Laws 1S75, gave the city council of the city of Winona the exclusive right to license persons vending intoxicating liquors within the limits of said city, and further provides that “ three-fourths of the money received from the licenses so granted shall he paid to the treasurer of the city of Winona, and one-fourth to the treasurer of the county of Winona.” Prior to this amendment the city was entitled, by its charter, to appropriate the money received for such licenses to its own exclusive use. Held, that it was competent for the legislature to enact this amendment, since the power of a city to license the sale of intoxicating liquors, and to collect license charges therefor, is a delegated police power, and therefore completely within the control of the legislature. Held, further,'' that under the proper construction of the amendment it is for the city treasui er to receive the entire license charge, as city treasurer, hut one-ftur h of it for the use and benefit of the county. Held, further, that it is the duty of the city treasurer to pay over to the county treasurer the one-fourth which he has received for the use and benefit of the county, without waiting for directions from the city authorities, notwithstanding the city charter provides that all funds in the city treasury shall be under the control of the city council, and shall be drawn out upen the order of the mayor and recorder.

    This action was brought in the district court for Winona county by the city of Winona, against the defendant Wbipple, as principal, and the defendants Henry W. Lamberton, Thomas Simpson, Frances M. Cockrell, Joseph A. Prentiss and Herman E. Curtiss, as sureties, upon the official bond of the defendant Whipple, as city treasurer of the'' city of Winona. The plaintiff demanded judgment against the defendants for the sum of $1,617.50, with interest and costs. The case was tried by the district court, for the county of Winona, Mitchell, J., presiding, who found, among other facts, that the defendant Whipple, while treasurer of the city of Winona, collected from applicants for license to sell intoxicating liquors within the said city the sum of $6,470, which he receipted for as said treasurer, entered the sum upon the books of the treasury, and deposited it with the other funds of the city; that he subsequently reported the receipt of this sum to the city council, in common with the general city fund, and charged the city the usual percentage for the collection of the whole of. said sum of $6,470, but credited himself with the sum of $1,617.50, paid to the treasurer of the county of Winona; that said percentage was duly paid the defendant for the collection of said money, but that the said sum of $1,617.50 was paid over to the county treasurer without the authority of the mayor, recorder or city council. The court further found, as a conclusion of law, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover in this action, and motion for a new trial having been denied, the plaintiff appealed.

    Wilson é Taylor, for appellant.

    The defendant claims to have acted under the authority of Sp. Laws 1875, c. 12, which purports to amend the proviso at the end of the first subdivision of section 2 of chapter 1 of the, charter of Winona; but it is clear that this amendment was inoperative, as there was no such proviso in that section of the charter. Moreover, the right to the profits arising from the licenses was vested in the city, and the disposition of the fund provided for by the charter could not, therefore, be changed without the consent’ of the plaintiff. Aberdeen v. Aberdeen, 13 Smedes & Marshall, 644; Aberdeen v. Sanderson, 8 • Smedes. ■& Marshall, 663. When the money was paid into the city treasury it became the money of the city, and could, thereafter, only be paid out on the order of the mayor and recorder, duly authorized by the vote of the city council, (Sp. Laws 1867, c. 20, sub. c. 4, §§ 5, 6; Poor v. Gains, 3 Brevard, 396;) the city thereafter was alone legally liable for the same, {Comm. v. Phila. 27 Pa. St. 497; Bullwinkle v. Guttenburg, 17 Wis. 601; Tunbridge v. Smith, 48 Yt. 648; Cooley on Taxation, 498, 599,) and the .defendant, a mere municipal officer, {People v. Solomon, 54 111. 39,) had no dominion over the fund. Dickens v. Jones, 6 Yerg. 483; Critchfield v. Wood, 16 Ala. 702; Taylor v. Board of Health, 31 Pa. St. 73.

    Again, the defendant is estopped by his report to the city council, and the acceptance of his fees, for the collection of the fund in dispute. Bigelow on Estop. (2d Ed.) 503; 2 Smith Lead. Cas. 133-145, 741-2, 796; Sedgw. on Stat. Con. (2d Ed.) 86, 87, 88; Board v. Board, Law Bep. 9 Q. B. 48; Smith v. Smith, 14 Grey, 532; Van Hook v. Whitlock, 26 Wend. 43; Hyde v. Baldwin, 17 Pick. 308; Ferguson v. Lm- . dram, 5 Bush. 230, 235-7; Bodemund v. Clark, 46 N. Y. 354; Maniner v. Mil. & St. P. R. Co. 26 Wis. 84, 89; Thompson v. Howard, 31 Mich. 309; Preston v. Jones, 9 Pa. St. 456; BwlingtonY. Gilbert, 31, Iowa, 356, 364-7; McGregor v. Reynolds, 19 Iowa, 228; Southland v. Perry, 21 Iowa, 488 ; Franklin v. Twogood, 18 Iowa, 515; Hodson v. Life Ins. Co. 97 Mass. 144; Bank v. N. W. P. 35 Iowa, 226; Pierce v. Tuttle, 58 N. Y. 650; Barker v. White, Id. 205, 214; Frierson v. Branch, 3 Cent. Law Jour. 334. Even if it therefore could be claimed that the defendant was authorized, under the amendment of the charter, to act as the agent, of the county, still it is clear under the circumstances that this construction would not aid the defendant. Neither is the defence admissible in this case that the defendant was not authorized to collect for the city more than three-fourths of the said license money. Cooley on Taxation, 498, 499, n. 5; Bulhuinkle v. Guttenberg, 17 Wis. 601; Waters v. State, 1 Gill. 302; Smythe v. Titeóme, 31 Me. 272; Neal v. School Comr’s, 27 Me. 221; Biafe v. BaZi. <# O. R., 34 Md. 344; State y. Cunningham, 8 Blackf. 339. Neither is the plaintiff entitled to merely nominal damages if his right of action be once established. Evarts v. Bwgess, 48 Yt. 205; Tunbridge v. Smith, Id. 648.

    Lloyd Bcvrber, for respondents.

    It is clear, from the whole context of chapter 13 of the Special Laws of 1875, that the legislature intended.to amend section 2 of chapter 4, instead of section 2 of chapter 1, of the city charter. Resort may therefore be had to implication in determining the legislative intent, (Sedgw. Stat. and Con. Law, 250; Cooley Con. Lim. 54, 57, 184; Potter Lwar. Stat. Con. 127,194, n. 13, 202, n. 19, 209, n. 22; McCartee v. Orphan Asykm, 9 Cow. 437; Dodge v. GHdley, 10 Ohio, 173 ; McMahon v. R. Co. 5 Ind. 413; McNamara v. R. Co. 12 Minn. 390; Bigelow v. Railway Co. 27 Wis. 486; Dwrousseau v. U. S. 6 Ct. 314; Opinion of the Justices, 22 Pick. 573,) and if the mistake is apparent upon the face of the statute, and the intention can clearly be ascertained from the whole statute, then such intent should be allowed to prevail. Potter Dwar. Stat. Con. 183, n. 5 ; Moody v. Stephenson, 1 Minn. 289, (401;) Earns v. Kunlile, 2 Minn. 270, (316;) Nichols v. Halliday, 27 Whs. 406; People v. King, 28 Cal. 266; Smithy. People, 47 N. Y. 335 5 Shrewsbury y. Boylstown, 1 Pick. 105; Twnpihe Co. v. McKean, 6 Hill, 616. It is well established, also, that the legislature had the right to change the charter of the city at any time, and in any particular. 1 Dill, on Municipal Corp. c. 4, § 30. The money likewise paid to the county never belonged to the city, and if an order was necessary the plaintiff has sustained no damage, because the money has been paid to the party legally entitled to it.

    Berry, J.

    By the provisions of section 2, sub-chapter 4, of the amended charter of the city of Winona, (Sp. Laws 1867, c. (20,) the city council is authorized to grant licenses to venders of intoxicating liquor, and to fix the price of the same at from $10 to $100. Though not so expressly enacted, it is to be inferred that the money to be paid for licenses is to be paid into the city treasury, and to be the property of the city.

    By Sp. Laws 1875, c. 13, § 1, it is provided “that section 2 of chapter 1 of said amended charter be amended so that the proviso at the end of the first subdivision shall read as follows: Provided, the city council shall have the exclusive right to license persons vending * * * intoxicating liquors within the limits of said city, and persons so licensed shall not be required to obtain a license from the board of county commissioners,” etc. Section 2 of the same chapter provides that “three-fourths of the money received from the licenses so granted shall be paid to the treasurer of the city of Winona, and one-fourth to the treasurer of the county of Winona.” Section 2 of chapter l.of the amended charter contains no subdivisions or provisos, and the amendment attempted by Sp. Laws 1875, c. 13, is in no way germane to that section. Section 2 of chapter 4 of such charter contains subdivisions, and a proviso at the end of the first subdivision, and to that subdivision the amendment is entirely appropriate, and to no other part of the charter. There can be no reasonable doubt that, by some inadvertence, “chapter 1” is used for “chapter 4” in the act of 1875, and, to carry out the manifest intention of the legislature, that act is to be read by substituting “chapter 4” for “chapter 1.”

    It was entirely competent for the legislature to amend the charter of the city of Winona, as it has done by the act of 1875, which was completely prospective in its scope and operation. The power of the city to license, and collect license charges, is a delegated police power, and therefore completely within the control of the legislature.

    Section 2 of the act of 1875 is somewhat obscure. It may mean that the entire charge of a license is to be paid to the city treasurer, and one-fourth of it paid by him to the county treasurer, or it may mean that the applicant for the license shall pay three-fourths of the charge to the city L.-usurer, and the remaining one-fourth to the county treasurer. But on the whole, and mainly in view of the fact that the whole subject of licensing appears to be committed to the city, authorities, we are of opinion that the former is the better construction. The consequence is, that the city treasurer receives the entire license charge, as city treasurer, but one-fourth of it for the use and benefit of the county.

    Section 5 of chapter 4 of the city charter enacts that all funds in the city treasury shall be under the control of the city council, and shall be drawn out upon the order of the mayor and recorder. This is, by implication, and in effect, to prohibit funds to be drawn from the city treasury except upon the order of the mayor and recorder. But, as respects the license moneys in question, this provision of the charter is controlled by the subsequently enacted requirement of the act of 1875, that one-fourth of the license money shall be paid to the county treasurer. By this requirement it is made the absolute duty of the city treasurer to pay over the one-fourth which he has received for the use and benefit of the county to the county treasurer, without waiting for directions from the city authorities. Having arrived at these conclusions, it is unnecessary for us to consider the other matters presented in the briefs.

    Order affirmed.'

  • 'Donald Albin BLOM, petitioner, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

    No. A07-782.

    Supreme Court of Minnesota.

    Dec. 27, 2007.

    Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 2008.

    Lori Swanson, Attorney General, John B. Galus, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, Thomas H. Pertler, Carlton County Attorney, Carlton, MN, for Respondent.

    OPINION

    MEYER, Justice.

    Appellant Donald Albin Blom appeals from the summary denial of his petition for postconviction relief. We affirm.

    On August 16, 2000, following a trial at the Saint Louis County Courthouse in the City of Virginia, Minnesota, a jury found Blom guilty of first-degree murder com mitted in the course of a kidnapping, in connection with the disappearance and death of Kathlyn Poirier. State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 588 (Minn.2004). Blom was sentenced to life in prison, without the possibility of parole, id., and is currently serving his sentence out of state.

    Blom appealed his conviction, and then requested a stay of his appeal while he sought posteonviction relief. Id. at 605-06. In that first posteonviction petition, Blom sought relief on the grounds that he had been denied his rights to effective assistance of trial counsel, to self-representation, to a fair trial (because of excessive media coverage), to present exculpatory evidence, to a second change of venue, and against self-incrimination (because his statement was not voluntary). Id. at 606. The posteonviction court held a hearing in June 2002 for the purpose of receiving evidence regarding Blom’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. Blom’s petition was denied. Id. at 607.

    Blom’s direct appeal was consolidated with his appeal of the posteonviction court’s order, and this court affirmed both in its July 2004 opinion. Id. at 626. In July of 2005, Blom filed a second petition for posteonviction relief, which the district court denied without an evidentiary hearing. That decision was not appealed. Blom asserts that the court failed to notify him of the order.

    In January 2007, Blom filed a “Motion to Compel,” asking that the district court grant his petition for posteonviction relief. The district court treated the motion as a third petition for posteonviction relief, and denied it without an evidentiary hearing, finding that all matters therein were Knaffla-b&rred. In this appeal, Blom appears to make five different claims: (1) that the district court did not apply the appropriate standard when reviewing his pro se petition for posteonviction relief; (2) that because his confession was coerced, its admission into evidence violated • his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (3) that the district court improperly asserted subject matter jurisdiction over federal charges by misleading him into believing that his confession would result in resolution of federal firearms charges, and by issuing orders interfering with Blom’s access to his federal public defender; (4) that he has been improperly denied the opportunity to develop evidence demonstrating his actual innocence, evidence about “coordinate jurisdiction,” and a trial record of “illegal collusion” and “[j judicial dishonesty”; and (5) that he is being improperly held out of state to prevent him from perfecting his appeal.

    When a person convicted of a crime petitions for posteonviction relief, the posteonviction court must hold an evi-dentiary hearing unless the “files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn.Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2006). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing by a fair preponderance of the evidence facts that warrant reopening the case. Minn.Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2006). When reviewing a posteonviction court’s denial of relief, this court examines whether the findings are supported by the evidence. Perry v. State, 731 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Minn.2007). The decision to grant or deny a new trial will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Id.

    Claims asserted in a second or subsequent posteonviction petition are procedurally barred under this court’s Knaffla rule if they were raised in a direct appeal or a previous posteonviction petition, or if they could have been raised in either. Id.; State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976). There are two exceptions to this rule. A claim may be considered despite the Knaffla bar if it is so novel that its legal basis was unavailable on direct appeal, or if the interests of justice require its consideration. Perry, 731 N.W.2d at 146 (citing White v. State, 711 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Minn.2006)). The second exception applies when fairness requires review and the petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the claim on direct appeal. Id.

    We have reviewed each of Blom’s claims in this, his third petition for post-conviction relief, and conclude that they are Knaffla-b&rred. The exceptions to- the Knaffla rule do not apply. Therefore, we conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying Blom’s petition without an evidentiary hearing.

    Affirmed.

    . A comprehensive statement of the facts can be found in our decision on direct appeal.'

• source_sentence: How does Minn.Stat. § 571.931 address service of garnishment summons? sentences:

  • 'IRWIN UNION BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a Washington corporation, Respondent, v. SPEEDY CAR WASH, INC., a Texas corporation, et al., Defendants, v. Raymond L. Zeug, Appellant.

    No. A03-559.

    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

    Dec. 16, 2003.

    Eric W. Forsberg, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.

    George E. Warner, Jr., Scott A. Lifson, Bernick and Lifson, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

    Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge; Minge, Judge; and Poritsky, Judge.

    OPINION

    PORITSKY, Judge.

    Respondent, a foreign corporation, obtained a default judgment in Texas against appellant. Respondent filed in Hennepin County district court a certified copy of the foreign judgment, together with an ex parte application for prejudgment garnishment of appellant’s Minnesota assets. The district court issued an order permitting respondent to immediately issue a garnishment summons. After the summons was served, appellant moved to vacate the garnishment. His motion was denied. Because we hold that for a prejudgment garnishment summons to issue, a summons and complaint in a Minnesota action must be filed and subsequently served, we reverse.

    FACTS

    In October 2002, respondent Irwin Union Bank and Trust Company (“the bank” or “Union Bank”) obtained a default judgment for $66,450 plus interest of $2,731 and attorney fees of $22,150 against appellant Raymond L. Zeug in Bexar County, Texas. Zeug maintained a bank account at the State Bank of Lucan in Lucan, Minnesota.

    In March 2003, Union Bank filed with Hennepin County District Court a certified copy of the Texas judgment, an ex parte application for prejudgment garnishment, and a supporting affidavit informing the court that “[the bank] is reliably informed that were ... Zeug given advance notice of a garnishment or other proceedings in Minnesota to domesticate or enforce the Texas judgment, [Zeug] would assign, secrete, or dispose of [his] non-exempt property presently on deposit with the State Bank of Lucan.” The bank did not file a Minnesota summons and complaint. The district court, citing the prejudgment garnishment statute (MinmStat. §§ 571.93, .931, .932, (2002)), authorized the bank to issue a garnishment summons, and the State Bank of Lucan froze Zeug’s account. Zeug served and filed a motion to vacate the garnishment. Following a hearing, the district court denied Zeug’s motion. He challenges that denial.

    ISSUE

    May a foreign-judgment creditor garnish the judgment debtor’s assets under Minn.Stat. §§ 571.93 and 571.931 (2002) without filing and subsequently serving a summons and complaint in a Minnesota action?

    ANALYSIS

    The construction of a statute is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc., v. County of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn.1998). The facts in this matter are undisputed. Whether a statute applies to the undisputed facts of a case is a question of law; the district court’s decision does not bind this court. O’Malley v. Ulland Bros., 549 N.W.2d 889, 892 (Minn.1996).

    Zeug argues that to proceed on the Texas judgment in Minnesota, “the bank had two choices, either to commence a new action by serving the summons and complaint upon Zeug or by use of the procedures set forth in the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act ...” (UEFJA). The bank did not proceed under the UEFJA. Instead it proceeded under Minn.Stat. §§ 571.93 and 571.931 (2002). Section 571.93, subdivision 1 reads in relevant part:

    The court may order the issuance of a garnishment summons before judgment or default in the civil action, if a summons and complaint, or copies of these documents, are filed with the appropriate court, and if, upon application to the court, it appears that any of the following grounds exist:

    (1) the debtor has assigned, secreted, or disposed of, or is about to assign, secrete, or dispose of, any of the debt- or’s nonexempt property, with intent to delay or defraud any of debtor’s creditors;

    .... or

    (6) the purpose of the garnishment is to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction and

    (ii) a judgment had previously been obtained in another state consistent with due process....

    Minn.Stat. § 571.93, subd. 1 (2002) (emphasis added).

    The bank sought to enforce its Texas judgment against Zeug by filing an ex parte application for pre-judgment garnishment of Zeug’s Minnesota bank account. The application stated that the effect of the garnishment “will be to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction over ... Zeug for the purpose of enforcing the Texas judgment” and that “[a] judgment has previously been obtained against ... Zeug in another State consistent with due process.” It also said that “[the bank] reasonably believes that if given prior notice of [the bank’s] garnishment ... Zeug would assign, secrete, or otherwise dispose of non-exempt property with the intent to delay and frustrate the efforts of [the bank] to enforce the judgment against ... Zeug.” But, as we have noted, the bank did not file a Minnesota summons and complaint, nor does it appear from the record that a Minnesota summons and complaint were subsequently served on Zeug.

    We conclude that in order to proceed under sections 571.93 and 571.931, a foreign-judgment creditor must give the Minnesota court jurisdiction by filing and subsequently serving a summons and complaint, thus starting a separate action in this state. The prejudgment garnishment statute specifically provides for a foreign-judgment creditor to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the debtor’s Minnesota assets. Minn.Stat. § 571.93, subd. l(6)(ii) (2002). Once the creditor complies with the requirements of the prejudgment garnishment statute, the creditor can take advantage of the procedures available under the statute, including serving a garnishment summons before giving notice to the debtor. Minn.Stat. §§ 571.93- 931 (2002).

    The bank states that it “filed an action in Hennepin County and argues that it “filed a civil action with the appropriate court and proceeded by written application.” What the bank filed, however, was the Texas judgment. Filing a foreign judgment does not satisfy the statute. The plain language of the statute requires the filing of, “a summons and complaint, or copies of these documents.... ” Minn. Stat. 571.93, subd.l (2002). And when the legislature chose to refer to a foreign judgment, it expressly used the language “a judgment ... previously ... obtained in another state.” Minn.Stat. § 571.93, subd. l(6)(ii) (2002). The statute specifies both the obtaining of a foreign judgment and the filing of the Minnesota action. Thus, the legislature did not intend that filing a foreign judgment was to be the equivalent of filing a Minnesota summons and complaint. The prejudgment garnishment statute goes on to provide that, if a garnishment summons issues before hearing, as it did in this case, a creditor is to serve “a copy of all pleadings and other documents not previously served.... ” Minn. Stat. § 571.931, subd. 6 (2002). Such service is to be accomplished “in the manner prescribed for personal service of a summons, unless that service is impracticable or would be ineffective, and the court prescribes an alternative method of service.” Id. Thus, the prejudgment garnishment statute contemplates that a summons and complaint are to be filed with the court and subsequently served, thereby initiating a Minnesota action. Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01(a) (“A civil action is commenced against each defendant when the summons is served upon that defendant.”) We conclude that, because the bank failed to comply with the requirements of section 571.93, the garnishment summons is void.

    Zeug also argues that the garnishment is void because the bank did not comply with the UEFJA when it initiated a proceeding prior to the expiration of the twenty-day notice period provided for in the UEFJA, in Minn.Stat. § 548.28 (2002). Because the bank did not proceed under the UEFJA, and because we have concluded that the garnishment summons is void by reason of the bank’s failure to comply with the provisions of the prejudgment garnishment statute, we need not address this argument.

    DECISION

    We conclude that a foreign-judgment creditor may not garnish a judgment debt- or’s assets under Minn.Stat. §§ 571.93 and 571.931 (2002) without first filing and subsequently serving a summons and complaint in a Minnesota action. Therefore, we reverse the denial of Zeug’s motion to vacate the garnishment.

    Reversed.

    Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.

    . In the case of a garnishment summons issued after notice and hearing, the applicable statute contemplates that an action will have been initiated. The statutory notice to the debtor reads in part, ‘‘[T]he court will decide whether your property should be garnished until the lawsuit which has been commenced against you has been decided.” Minn.Stat. § 571.932, subd. 2 (2002) (emphasis added).'

  • 'BECKER COUNTY NATIONAL BANK v. A. B. DAVIS.

    March 17, 1939.

    No. 31,983.

    Eriksson & Eriksson, for appellant.

    O. U. Landrum and D. N. Lindeman, for respondent.

    Reported in 284 N. W. 789.

    Julius J. Olson, Justice.

    Defendant appeals from an order denying his blended motion for judgment notwithstanding or new trial.

    The action was brought to recover principal and interest on a promissory note for $590 given by defendant to plaintiff May 25, 1937, due on demand. In addition thereto, plaintiff also sought recovery of $100 as attorney’s fees, as by the terms of the note the maker had agreed to pay collection charges or “reasonable attorney’s fees” if the note was not paid.

    The present note was given in renewal of a prior note and accumulated interest given by defendant to one George Lund, dated May 18, 1936, for $550, due December 15, 1936, with interest at six per cent from its date until paid. A few days after the date of the $550 note it was endorsed to plaintiff by said Lund, who also guaranteed its payment.

    Defendant’s answer admitted the execution and delivery of the note in suit and that it was unpaid and, in addition, that the note provided he would pay “all costs of collection or a reasonable attorney’s fee in connection with the collection of said note.” By way of avoidance he alleged that the note “was made without consideration and that plaintiff had notice thereof and never paid any consideration therefor.” As his “affirmative defense,” he alleged that fraud was practiced upon him in the procurement of the $550 note. The basis upon which the claimed fraud was predicated is not here important. Plaintiff’s reply put in issue all new matters pleaded, and alleged that the fraudulent practices relied upon by defendant were, as to Mr. Lund, “res judicata” by reason of a decision rendered in another action wherein this defendant was plaintiff and said Lund and many others were defendants; that as a result of that trial and with plaintiff’s consent in that case a dismissal on the merits was rendered in behalf of Mr. Lund. Plaintiff further claimed that as the result of that action and by virtue of the judgment there entered defendant now is estopped from asserting the contrary in this action.

    At the trial these additional facts developed: Prior to May 18, 1936, one Robert Orosz and several others associated with him made a deal with defendant whereby certain real property in Superior, Wisconsin, was sold to defendant. In connection with that deal several notes were executed by defendant to Orosz and his associates. One of these men came to Lund’s place of business (Lund being a dealer in automobiles and trucks) and expressed a desire of purchasing a truck, offering one of defendant’s $550 notes to apply upon the purchase price. Lund did not wish to go into this kind of deal but informed the prospective purchaser that he knew defendant Davis, considered him perfectly responsible, and suggested that if the note sought to be negotiated could be exchanged for a new note to be given by defendant and made payable to Mr. Lund, a deal could be made. This was done. But even then Mr. Lund would not go through with the deal until he could see defendant Davis personally. He did so, and, being assured by Mr. Davis that the note bore his genuine signature, the deal was later consummated, and the truck delivered to the purchaser.

    In July, 1936, long prior to the execution of the note here in suit, defendant Davis, appearing by his present counsel, brought suit against Robert Orosz and many other individuals, including Lund. In his complaint he sought to have Lund, as the holder of one of the notes involved in the land case, bound by the judgment to be entered in the main action against the perpetrators of the alleged fraud in the transaction. At the trial of that action Lund was called for cross-examination by counsel for Davis. It then developed that the facts were as we have outlined them. Counsel for plaintiff stated to the court, and this statement was made a matter of record, that as to the note given to Mr. Lund by Davis: “It is conceded of record that the note having been negotiated at the time in question was transferred in such a manner as to be good in the hands of this man and so far as he is concerned we have no intention to question the validity and quality of the note whatever as to him.” Later on, while counsel were discussing this matter, the court said: “So far as this defendant [Lund] is concerned he is certainly out of the woods.” Mr. Eriksson, speaking for Mr. Davis, said: “We concede that.”

    With this proof coming into the trial of this case the court was of opinion that defendant’s offer of proof of fraud respecting Orosz and his companions was incompetent and immaterial to the issues here presented; that as to the note given to Mr. Lund and later negotiated to plaintiff there was no defense. Both parties moved for direction of verdict in their own favor. When the case was finally submitted, the court granted plaintiff’s motion, denying defendant’s, in the amount claimed and included also $100 as attorney’s fees.

    Defendant is in an anomalous position. In the former action (the one brought by Davis against Orosz, et al.) Davis, by his duly authorized counsel, conceded that the note given to Lund was free from attack; that so far as Lund was concerned, “We have no intention to question the validity and quality of the note.” When the court granted Lund’s motion for a finding on the merits in his favor counsel for Davis said: “That motion is granted with our approval * * Even now defendant in his brief states: “No claim was made in this former action that George Lund had been a party to the fraud which produced the note.” (Reference being had to the $550 note given by Davis to Lund.) When these matters and transaction took place before the court at the September, 1937, term of court Lund had disclosed the circumstances by virtue of which he came into possession of this note; that he had parted with a valuable truck upon the belief that he had a good note given by one whom he considered financially responsible and had applied the amount of the note as a part payment thereof.

    The original obligation as between Davis and Lund having been established by virtue of agreement of counsel and resulting in a final judgment, we are simply wasting time in discussing whether the renewal note given to plaintiff, representing as it does the same obligation, may now be enforced by the holder.

    Unquestionably there was a consideration for the instrument. Defendant asserts that he got nothing out of it. But that is not material because it conclusively appears that one of Orosz’s associates did receive the consideration from Lund. And that this was as effectual as if it had moved directly to Mr. Davis is clear.

    “Any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract is value for a negotiable instrument. * * * Accordingly, such consideration may be said to consist in any benefit to the promisor, or in a loss or detriment to the promisee; or to exist ‘when at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or abstain from doing, something,’ the consideration being the act, abstinence, or promise.” 7 Am. Jur., Bills and Notes, § 233.

    Defendant having in the former action taken a definite stand in respect to this instrument, he should not now be permitted to retry the identical issue there presented and determined adversely to his present contentions.

    Much argument is devoted to the fact that plaintiff bank was not a party to that action and that at the time of trial the note was in its, not in Lund’s, possession. That too is unimportant for the simple reason that Lund had not only endorsed the note but had guaranteed its payment. As such he had a vital interest to protect and preserve. As defendant would in any event be obligated to pay Lund the original amount and interest on the $550 note given to Lund, it necessarily follows that the renewal in the hands of the bank is likewise free from the attack now presented. See O’Brien v. Manwaring, 79 Minn. 86, 81 N. W. 746, 79 A. S. R. 426.

    Defendant’s brief consists of some 62 pages and is further elaborated by a reply brief. One would naturally think that something helpful would be cited in respect to the claimed error on the part of the court in allowing $100 attorney’s fees. Six lines are devoted in his brief to that issue:

    “The defendant’s position is that without an allegation showing that an attorney fee had been incurred, the amount of which would be charged against the defendant, no foundation had been laid for any extra attorney’s fees and that when the court overruled the objection, an error was committed.”

    When this question of attorney’s fees came before the court at the trial of the present case Mr. Landrum was on the stand testifying for the plaintiff. He was about to state his opinion in respect to the “reasonable attorney’s fee” in this case. This is what the record shows:

    Mr. Eriksson: “Wait a minute right there. I would like to interpose an objection at this point, it appearing that the witness is about to express an opinion as to the reasonable value of the attorney’s fee. Defendant objects to it on the ground that it is inadmissible under the pleadings, and no foundation has been laid. For the purpose of helping the court as well as counsel, it is not that counsel is not qualified''to express an opinion or that the stated sum is not a fair compensation, tut we claim that the pleadings do not lay the foundation necessary to express an opinion.” (Italics supplied.)

    It will thus be seen that defendant did not object because the sum claimed by plaintiff “is not a fair compensation” nor did the objection go to lack of qualification on the part of Mr. Landrum “to express an opinion” in respect thereof. The whole objection goes only to the sufficiency of the complaint, which did set forth that “by said note the defendant promised and agreed to pay all costs of collection or a reasonable attorney’s fee in connection with the collection of said note.” This paragraph was admitted by defendant’s answer. The next paragraph states that the “reasonable attorney’s fee for the collection of said note is one hundred dollars ($100.00).” So it will be observed defendant was advised that this sum was wanted by plaintiff as a part of defendant’s written promise. There being no motion to make the complaint more specific and certain and no demurrer having been interposed, we would be going far afield were we now to reverse because of inadequacy of this pleading. The court was of opinion that “the fact that this case has been on trial is ample evidence for the necessity of [attorney’s] services.”

    We are not to be understood as holding that the jury was bound to accept plaintiff’s proof in this regard to be conclusive. This court has held in many cases that: “The opinion of experts as to the value of services, even though not directly contradicted, is not in ordinary cases conclusive.” Morris v. Wulke, 141 Minn. 27, 28, 169 N. W. 22; Pye v. Diebold, 204 Minn. 319, 322, 283 N. W. 487, 489. All Ave do hold is that the objection made by defendant does not go to that issue. “A party is not only bound to make specific objections at the time the evidence is offered, but he is also limited on appeal to the objections he raised below.” 1 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. (2 ed. & 1932 Supp.) § 405, and cases cited under note 75.

    Further discussion is unnecessary. The result reached is right, and the order is affirmed.

    Mr. Justice Hilton, incapacitated by illness, took no part.'

  • 'Claudia McCLAIN, as Trustee for the heirs and next of kin of Michelle Elizabeth McClain, decedent, petitioner, Appellant, v. Bridget J. BEGLEY, petitioner, Appellant, Christine S. Meyers, Defendant, Altra Auto Rental, Inc., a division of Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., Respondent. and ALTRA AUTO RENTAL, INC., A DIVISION OF AGENCY RENT-A-CAR, INC., Respondent, v. FIREMEN’S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, petitioner, Appellant.

    No. C1-89-2206.

    Supreme Court of Minnesota.

    Feb. 15, 1991.

    Eric Magnuson, Andrew M. Walsh, Rider, Bennett, Egan & Arundel, William M. Hart, R. Gregory Stephens, Meagher & Geer, Minneapolis, for appellants.

    Scott W. Johnson, James A. O’Neal, Paul W. Heirling, Faegre & Benson, Bonita J. Girard, Bassford, Hecht, Lochhart & Mul-lía, Minneapolis, for respondents.

    YETKA, Justice.

    This case is here on appeal from the court of appeals, which reversed summary judgment awarded by the trial court on motion of plaintiff McClain. We reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

    Petitioner McClain brought an action against Altra Auto Rental, Inc., Bridget Begley, and Christine Meyers for the wrongful death of her daughter, Michelle McClain. The death resulted from a ear accident involving a car rented by Michelle McClain, Begley and Meyers from Altra. Altra insured the rental car through a plan of self-insurance under the no-fault act. Allstate insured Begley, the driver of the rental car at the time of the accident, through her parents’ liability policy. After McClain commenced suit, Altra brought a declaratory judgment action against Allstate to determine priority of coverage.

    In January 1988, McClain moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that Al-tra’s self-insurance plan provided primary coverage to the extent of the $500,000 liability limits stated on the certificate of insurance. The motion was granted on April 7, 1988. Altra’s petition for discretionary review was denied by the court of appeals. Thereafter, the parties stipulated to damages and the entry of judgment with the express understanding that Altra would appeal the summary judgment decision.

    The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that, in the absence of express liability coverage limits in a self-insurance plan, a self-insurer is liable only for the statutory minimum amount of coverage. McClain v. Begley, 457 N.W.2d 230 (Minn.App.1990). Respondents McClain and Begley appealed. This court granted respondents’ petition for review.

    This case arises from an automobile accident on March 30, 1986, in Missouri. Michelle McClain, Bridget Begley, Christine Meyers, and Shannon Murphy, all college students, planned a spring-break trip to Padre Island, Texas. Prior to the trip, Murphy contacted Altra about renting a car. An agent of Altra told Murphy that, to qualify for the least expensive rate, she must rent the car as a replacement for an insured, but out-of-service car. Murphy told the agent that McClain had an out-of-service car insured through Firemen’s Fund Insurance.

    On March 21,1986, the Altra agent delivered the car to Murphy and Meyers. Meyers signed the rental contract which stated that Altra did not provide liability coverage on the car and that the car was to be insured by the lessee. A few days after the rental contract was signed, the agent filled in the rental form with a fictitious policy number, agent, and agency phone number. On March 30,1986, as the women were returning from the trip, Begley fell asleep at the wheel and collided with a car parked on the shoulder of an interstate in Missouri. McClain was killed in the collision.

    Altra insures its cars through a plan of self-insurance. As a self-insured entity, Al-tra completed and filed the forms developed by the Department of Commerce. One of the forms included a question and an answer which we repeat as follows:

    12. List all excess insurance applicable to motor vehicle accidents, with name(s) of insurer(s), policy number(s) and limits of liability.

    Lexington Insurance Company

    Policy No. 552 8742

    Effective: 12-31-86/87

    Amount of Insurance: $2,500,000 in

    excess of $500,000 S.I.R.

    [Self-insured Retention]

    The above question and answer was part of a form entitled “REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION FROM INSURING LIABILITIES UNDER THE MINNESOTA NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ACT.”

    The parties to the lawsuit entered into a stipulation which, in substance, provided the following: Altra owned the car in which McClain was killed. The negligence of Begley, the driver, was the sole cause of McClain’s death. The total damages for the death are $155,000. If the trial court orders are upheld on final appeal, Altra will pay $155,000 to plaintiff. If Altra’s obligation is limited to the statutory minimum, Altra will pay $30,000 and Allstate will pay $100,000.

    As a result of all this pre-appeal maneuvering, the parties agree and have submitted to the court the following:

    1. The question of the applicability of Minnesota’s car owner’s responsibility act is not raised and is thus not before this court.

    2. Altra sought protection of its fleet under the Minnesota no-fault act.

    3. Altra, through its rental agreements, had attempted to shift responsibility for all liability coverage to the lessees of its cars and absolve itself of any liability. This has been held illegal by the Minnesota Department of Commerce.

    4. Thus, the sole issue for this court to decide involves the interpretation of the no-fault insurance act, Minn.Stat. §§ 65B.41-65B.71 (1990), and its applicability to self-insurers. Interpretation of statutes is a question of law. Hibbing Educ. Ass’n v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 369 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Minn.1985). The parties have stipulated to the facts and to the amount of damages. This court thus must determine whether the court of appeals erred in its application of the law to the facts of this case. This court is not bound by the decision of the court of appeals. A.J. Chromy Constr. Co. v. Commercial Mechanical Serv., Inc., 260 N.W.2d 579 (Minn.1977).

    The Minnesota no-fault act imposes a duty on the owner of a motor vehicle to maintain “a plan of reparation security * * * insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for injury and property damage by any person arising out of the ownership * * * of the vehicle.” Minn.Stat. § 65B.48, subd. 1. The owner has the choice of self-insuring or buying an insurance policy. The act states five purposes: to relieve the “severe economic distress of uncompensated victims,” to prevent overcompensation, to provide prompt payment, to reduce litigation, and to correct abuses of the tort liability system. Minn.Stat. § 65B.42. The obligations imposed on self-insurers should reflect those goals.

    Self-insurance is the functional equivalent of a commercial insurance policy. The law of workers’ compensation treats self-insurers no differently than those who insure by commercial policy. The purpose of either form of insurance is to compensate victims appropriately. The certificate filed with the commissioner is the functional equivalent of an insurance policy.

    While under the Minnesota no-fault statutes, Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3(1), any insurer is required to have liability coverage of $30,000 as a minimum, Altra made a deliberate representation to the Department of Commerce to provide coverage in excess of that amount, namely, $500,000. Based on that representation and other data supplied to the Department of Commerce, Altra was accepted as a self-insured. It should thus be held to the representations that it made.

    The cases and precedent cited in the briefs are simply not applicable to the unique facts of this case, for the decision in this case is based more on equitable estop-pel principles than on any other.

    The court of appeals is thus reversed and judgment of the trial court reinstated.

    COYNE and GARDEBRING, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this matter.

    . The parties stipulated to damages of $155,000, noting that if the summary judgment decision is reversed, then Altra will pay the statutorily mandated amount, $30,000, and Allstate will pay the limit of its secondary liability, $100,000. Thus, were the summary judgment decision reversed, McClain’s estate would be uncompensated for $25,000.'

• source_sentence: Are verbal negotiations sufficient evidence to reform a written real estate contract? sentences:

  • 'In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Gerald Charles ANDERSON, a.k.a. Gerald C. Anderson, Deceased.

    No. C5-85-871.

    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

    Dec. 24, 1985.

    Review Denied Feb. 19, 1986.

    Richard A. Beens, Anoka, for appellant Mary Ann Reynolds.

    Rolf T. Nelson, Robbinsdale, for respondents Sally Ann Sellers, Carol Ann Young, Robert Charles Anderson and Carl Earl Anderson.

    Heard, considered and decided by HUS-PENI, P.J., and FOLEY and FORSBERG, JJ.

    OPINION

    HUSPENI, Judge.

    Mary Ann Reynolds, appellant and daughter of decedent Gerald Anderson, attempted to admit into probate a second codicil to decedent’s will. Respondents, who were decedent’s four other children, objected to the probate of this second codicil. An advisory jury found that the second codicil was executed as a result of undue influence exerted by Reynolds. The trial court adopted the advisory jury’s finding of undue influence. Reynolds appeals from the order denying probate of the second codicil and the trial court’s denial of her motion for amended findings or a new trial. We reverse.

    FACTS

    In 1981, decedent executed a will leaving his entire estate to his five children in equal shares. Later that same year, decedent executed a codicil to his will which merely changed the designated personal representative.

    On April 17, 1984, decedent was found intoxicated and walking about the neighborhood near his home in Osseo, Minnesota. The police took him home and, at his direction, telephoned Reynolds in Oklahoma City. Reynolds told the police to take her father to the hospital. She left later that same evening by car for Minneapolis. Decedent was taken immediately to the Veterans Administration Hospital in Minneapolis.

    Reynolds left Oklahoma City without informing any of her brothers or sisters of their father’s condition. All respondents also resided in Oklahoma City. Upon arriving in Minneapolis on April 18, Reynolds went to visit her father at the hospital and there learned that he was terminally ill. She then proceeded to take charge of her father’s affairs.

    On April 19, Reynolds contacted Medard Kaisershot, decedent’s attorney who drafted decedent’s will and first codicil, and told him that her father wished to deed his house to her. Kaisershot met with decedent that same day in the hospital. Early the next morning Reynolds telephoned Kaisershot and told him that her father would not recover from his illness. Kaiser-shot returned that afternoon with the second codicil to decedent’s will which was executed there in the hospital. Reynolds was not present during either of these two meetings between decedent and his attorney.

    The second codicil provided that Reynolds alone receive the homestead. It did not otherwise change the will which provided that all five children share equally in the remainder of decedent’s estate. Apart from the homestead, the estate consisted primarily of decedent’s coin and currency collections. Decedent valued these collections at around $100,000, although it appears they were in fact worth much less at the time of his death.

    On April 28, three days after the codicil was executed, Reynolds arranged for another attorney to prepare a general power of attorney. This power of attorney, executed that same day, gave Reynolds control over decedent’s safety deposit boxes which contained his coin and currency collections. Soon thereafter, decedent signed a signature card naming Reynolds the joint owner of his checking account. At no time did she inform her brothers and sisters that she was in Minneapolis, that their father was dying or that she was taking charge of their father’s affairs.

    Hospital records indicate that decedent was alert and oriented from the time of his admission on April 17 until execution of the codicil on April 20. Kaisershot testified that decedent recognized him immediately when he entered his hospital room on April 19. Decedent appeared to be alert throughout Kaisershot’s explanation of the tax advantages of conveying the house by will rather than by a quit claim deed. When Kaisershot asked decedent whether he wanted Reynolds alone to have the entire homestead, decedent responded “yes” without hesitation. When Kaisershot returned to the hospital on April 20, decedent again confirmed that he intended Reynolds alone to get the house. Decedent then signed the codicil although he probably could not read it due to his poor eyesight. Decedent’s physical condition progressively worsened and he remained in the hospital until he died on May 14, 1984.

    In his prime, decedent was a strong-willed man with numerous avocations. Although his physical activity was restricted in his final years, he continued to evidence his strength of will. Barely three months before his death, he angrily confronted his son who, while visiting decedent, had stayed out too long without first informing his father. Even during his last days in the hospital, he would refuse to take his medicine if he did not like the taste.

    During the last five years of his life, decedent saw Reynolds more often than his other children. She visited decedent in Minnesota once a year, whereas only one of her siblings visited him in the last five years and that visit was incidental to a funeral one of her brothers was attending. During his last two visits to Oklahoma, decedent stayed at Reynolds’ house.

    Unlike her brothers and sisters, Reynolds did not criticize or exclude her father for his sometimes crude and inappropriate manner of speaking. She would purchase alcohol for him if he requested and, although she did tell him he should quit drinking, she did not insist that he seek alcohol treatment as did her brothers and sisters. In addition, an acquaintance of decedent testified that decedent had referred to Reynolds as his “number one child.”

    ISSUE

    Did the trial court err in finding that decedent’s second codicil was executed as a result of undue influence by appellant?

    ANALYSIS

    This court will not set aside a trial court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Minn.R.Civ.P. 52.01. A trial court’s finding will be deemed clearly erroneous only if “the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re Estate of Balafas, 293 Minn. 94, 96, 198 N.W.2d 260, 261 (1972) (quoting United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326, 339, 72 S.Ct. 690, 698, 96 L.Ed. 978 (1952)).

    Under Minn.Stat. § 524.3-407 (1984), contestants of a will have the burden of establishing undue influence. It is well settled that the will contestant must establish undue influence by clear and convincing proof. In re Estate of Pundt, 280 Minn. 102, 104, 157 N.W.2d 839, 841 (1968). Clear and convincing proof will be shown where the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable. Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn.1978).

    In order for a court to find that someone exerted undue influence:

    [t]he evidence must go beyond suspicion and conjecture and show, not only that the influence was in fact exerted, but that it was so dominant and controlling of the testator’s mind that, in making the will, he ceased to act on his own free volition and became a mere puppet of the wielder of that influence.

    In re Estate of Reay, 249 Minn. 123, 126-27, 81 N.W.2d 277, 280 (1957) (footnote omitted).

    Direct evidence of undue influence is not required and is usually unobtainable because the influence is rarely exercised openly in the presence of others. In re Estate of Olson, 176 Minn. 360, 365, 223 N.W. 677, 679 (1929). Therefore, the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient to indicate undue influence. Id.

    Among the factors important as bearing upon the fact of undue influence are the opportunity to exercise it, active participation in the preparation of the will by the party exercising it, a confidential relationship between the person making the will and the party exercising the influence, disinheritance of those whom the decedent probably would have remembered in his will, singularity of the provisions of the will, and the exercise of influence or persuasion to induce him to make the will in question.

    In re Estate of Wilson, 223 Minn. 409, 413, 27 N.W.2d 429, 432 (1947).

    After thoroughly reviewing the record in this case, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the trial court mistakenly found that respondents satisfied their burden of establishing by clear and convincing proof that Reynolds exerted undue influence upon decedent. We do not consider that respondents presented sufficient evidence to meet their heavy burden of proof.

    Reynolds did have the opportunity to exert undue influence while she was visiting her father in the hospital around the time when he executed the codicil. However, opportunity alone will not sustain a finding of undue influence. In re Estate of Holden, 261 Minn. 527, 113 N.W.2d 87 (1962). In this case, there is no conclusive evidence that anything more than the opportunity for undue influence existed.

    Reynolds did not actively participate in the preparation of the codicil. Although she arranged the meetings between her father and Kaisershot, she was not present during these meetings. Kaisershot was not an attorney selected by Reynolds. He was her father’s attorney of several years’ standing. There was no evidence that Reynolds instructed her father to execute a deed or a codicil. In addition, Kaisershot testified that decedent asserted that he wanted Reynolds alone to get the homestead.

    Respondents argue that Reynolds’ confidential relationship with her father is indicative of undue influence. Although a confidential relationship may be a factor indicating undue influence, any evidence of intimacy or affection between blood relatives “negatives rather than proves undue influence.” In re Estate of Marsden, 217 Minn. 1, 11-12, 13 N.W.2d 765, 771 (1944). It is apparent that there was such intimacy and affection between Reynolds and decedent. Reynolds came to Minnesota each year for extended visits with decedent and decedent called her his “number one child.” Therefore, the close relationship between Reynolds and decedent tends to refute a finding of undue influence.

    Although decedent devised the bulk of his estate to Reynolds, he did not disinherit his other children. All five children shared equally in the remainder of the estate, including the coin and currency collections which decedent valued at $100,000. Therefore, decedent believed he was leaving a substantial amount to each of his other children. Decedent’s belief that he adequately provided for his other children, coupled with the substantial evidence that Reynolds was his favorite child, lead us to conclude that decedent’s division of his estate was not unusual or unexplainable. Hence, decedent’s division of his estate does not indicate the exercise of undue influence upon him. Accord In re Estate of Meehan, 220 Minn. 1, 5, 18 N.W.2d 781, 783 (1945).

    Respondents argue that Reynolds’ failure to tell them about their father’s illness indicates that she influenced him to execute the codicil. Although Reynolds may have behaved suspiciously, respondents offered no evidence of how Reynolds interacted with her father around the time the codicil was executed. Further, the evidence indicates that decedent, although physically weak, was alert and able to communicate while in the hospital. He also had enough mental vigor to refuse medicine he did not like and to assert that Reynolds should get the house. Consequently, any conclusion drawn from Reynolds’ purported secrecy is mere suspicion and conjecture and does not establish undue influence. See In re Estate of Reay, 249 Minn. at 126-27, 81 N.W.2d at 280.

    Upon a review of all the evidence, we believe that respondents did not meet their burden of establishing undue influence by clear and convincing proof. Among all the factors tending to show undue influence, respondents established only that Reynolds had an opportunity to exert undue influence. Absent evidence of some of the other factors, opportunity alone cannot sustain a finding of undue influence. See In re Estate of Holden; In re Estate of Reay; In re Estate of Meehan; In re Will of Hess, 48 Minn. 504, 51 N.W. 614 (1892). We do not lightly overturn trial court findings. However, we cannot disturb the presumed validity of a duly executed will or codicil unless the opponent offers clear and convincing proof of its invalidity.

    DECISION

    The trial court erred in finding that decedent’s second codicil was executed as a result of undue influence by the appellant.

    Reversed.'

  • 'GUSTAV ZIEGENHAGEN v. ROBERT HARTWIG AND JULIA HARTWIG, HUSBAND AND WIFE.

    November 25, 1921.

    No. 22,471.

    Vendor and purchaser—reformation of description — homestead of defendants.

    The evidence ,in this case sustains findings that defendants, husband and wife, both participated in verbal negotiations for the sale of their homestead; that the husband, with the assent of the wife, went with the buyer to a scrivener to have a contract prepared; that both parties signed it, believing that it was a contract for the sale of the homestead; that through mutual mistake an erroneous description was inserted in the contract. On such findings the court was justified in reforming the contract and enforcing specific performance against both husband and wife.

    Action in the district court for Le Sueur county to reform and enforce a contract. The case was tried before Olsen, J., who made findings and ordered judgment in favor of plaintiff. From an order denying their motion to amend the findings or for a new trial, defendants appealed.

    Affirmed.

    Thomas Hessian, for appellants.

    L. W. ''Prendergasi and Moonan cG Moonan, fox respondent.

    Reported in 185 N. W. 382.

    Haliam, J.

    This action is brought to reform the description in a contract for the sale of real estate by defendants to plaintiff and to enforce the contract as so reformed. The court found for plaintiff. Defendants appeal. The contract was in writing and purported to be a contract for a deed of the NE14 of the SEi/4 of section 32. In fact the defendants did not own this property but the defendant Robert Hartwig did own the SE% of the SE^4 °f said section and it was the homestead of the parties. The contention of the plaintiff is that the parties entered into negotiation for a sale of this homestead to plaintiff and then caused a written contract to be prepared, intending that it should contain the correct description of this property and that the description actually inserted was inserted through mutual mistake.

    In Lindell v. Peters, 129 Minn. 288, 152 N. W. 648, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1130, this court held that a conveyance of the homestead, executed by both husband and wife as required by statute, may be reformed by correcting a mistake in the description of the property intended to be conveyed thereby.

    Courts will naturally proceed cautiously in giving relief that will compel a transfer of a homestead, and will likewise proceed cautiously in reforming a written contract on evidence altogether verbal. But parties are bound to observe contract obligations, though they involve a sale of the homestead, and, if proof is satisfactorily made, relief should be granted.

    The evidence in this case is in conflict. Plaintiff testified that the verbal negotiation was had with both of the defendants; that both were present when the sale was- determined upon and the price fixed; that, with the assent of both defendants, plaintiff and Robert Hartwig went to a scrivener to have a contract of sale prepared and that, after if had been -so prepared, it- was presented to the defendant Julia Hartwig as such contract and that she signed it. Plaintiff is corroborated by several members of his own family and also in some measure by two disinterested witnesses. Defendants denied that defendant Julia Hartwig was present at any of the preliminary negotiations and denied that she knew about them, and they testified that the contract was presented to her, with the statement that it was simply a paper for her to- sign and that she believed it was a bond in connection with a criminal prosecution then pending against her husband.

    The evidence is abundantly sufficient to sustain a finding in favor of plaintiffs contention that both defendants participated in the negotiation, both understanding that the negotiation was for the sale of their homestead, and that the error in the description was due to mutual mistake. This finding must accordingly be sustained and it follows that the decision in favor of plaintiff should.be affirmed.

    Affirmed.'

  • 'Sellers Hoffman vs. Minneapolis Mutual Fire Insurance Company.

    January 8, 1890.

    Fire Insurance — Construction of Policy — Apportionment of !Loss.— In the defendant’s policy of insurance for $2,000 the property insured was set forth in a schedule prepared by the assured, comprising many distinct classes, and opposite each class or division had been written (by the assured) specific sums of money, the whole of which amounted to $90,000. By the terms of the policy it was to cover “one forty-fifth of the above-named sums, amounting in the aggregate to $2,000.” It also provided that the company should not be liable for a greater proportion of the loss than the sum insured by this policy bore to the whole insur anee. The whole insurance at the time of loss amounted to $60,000. Held, that the defendant was liable for one-thirtieth of the loss (that being less than the insurance) upon each of the specified claims of property, (the same proportion as this insurance bears to the whole insurance,) and not merely to one forty-fifth of the loss, as claimed by defendant.

    Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court for Hennepin county, Rea, J., presiding, overruling Ms demurrer to the answer.

    Robert Stratton and James A. Kellogg, for appellant.

    Keith, Evans, Thompson é Fairchild, for respondent.

    Dickinson, J.

    This is an action upon a policy of insurance, issued by the defendant to the plaintiff, for the total sum of $2,000. The contention is only as to the proportion of the loss for which the defendant is liable. The following statement will present in brief the facts upon which our decision is sought by this appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to the answer: Prior to the issuing of the policy the plaintiff, making his application for insurance, presented to the defendant a printed schedule of the property desired to be insured, this schedule containing more than 20 separate classes of property, each class or item commencing with the word “on;” and opposite each of these classes was written in figures a specific sum of money. These sums ranged from $500 to $39,000, and were added at the bottom, the aggregate being $90,000. The first and second of these classes, with the annexed amounts, are here given in brief, and will serve to show how the whole schedule was made up, all the others being in like form:

    On stone building marked “A” on plan .... $10,000

    On stone building marked “B” on plan - - - 5,000

    Following this schedule was a description, in printed form, of the location of the property; also a clause expressing a privilege “to make other insurance, without notice until required;” and a further paragraph, with blank spaces, in which the defendant wrote the words and figures which we will distinguish by italics. When so filled out, it read as follows: “It is understood and agreed that the Minneapolis Mutual Fire Insurance Company, of Minneapolis, Minn,, covers, under their policy No. 12,674, to which this specification is attached and made a part thereof, l-45th part of each of the above-named sums, amounting in the aggregate to two thousand dollars.” This paper was attached to one of the defendant’s printed forms of policy, immediately following the statement of the sum ($2,000) written in the policy as the amount ''of the insurance, and thus became a part of the policy; there being in the policy no other description of the property insured than that contained in the instrument so affixed. The policy contains also a provision that this company shall not be liable “for a greater proportion of any loss upon property described in this policy than the sum hereby insured bears to the whole sum insured thereon.” The whole insurance upon the property at the time of the loss was $60,000. The loss extended to all the classes of property named, and amounted in the aggregate to $51,000. The plaintiff- seeks to ''recover from the defendant one-thirtieth of the loss upon each of the several classes of property named in the policy; that is, the same proportion of the loss as the amount of the defendant’s insurance bears to the whole insurance, $60,000. The defend, ant contends that its liability is limited to one forty-fifth of the amount of the loss.

    Whatever may have been the full purpose or intention involved in affixing specific sums to the several items of property insured, all of which sums aggregated $90,000, the effect of the clause in the agreement that the defendant “covers under this policy * * * l-45th part of each of the above-named sums, amounting in the aggregate to two thousand dollars,” is to apportion the total insurance of two thousand dollars to these separate divisions of the property, so that one forty-fifth of the sums annexed to these divisions, respectively, shall be taken as the insurance of this company. Making the arithmetical computation thus indicated, and inserting the one forty-fifth of “each of the above-named sums” in place of those sums, and following the language of the policy, it would express the agreement of the defendant to “insure Sellers Hoffman against loss or damage by fire to the amount of two thousand dollars.

    “On stone building marked ‘ A ’ on plan - - - - $222.22

    “On stone building marked‘B’on plan ... 111.11”

    —And so on through the list of 21 items. The aggregate of the sums thus arrived at would be $2,000. It is obvious that such an apportionment of the whole insurance was intended to be made, and that this was not intended as a blanket policy, insuring the whole property, without apportionment, in the sum of $2,000.

    Under the clause declaring that the defendant should not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss than the sum insured by this policy bears to the whole sum of the insurance, this company became liable for one-thirtieth of the loss upon each one of the specified classes of property, up to the extent of .the sums apportioned to such classes, respectively, by the terms of this policy,— that is, its proportion of the loss is as $2,000 is to $60,000, the whole sum of the insurance; and, thus computed, the liability of the defendant would amount to the sum claimed in the complaint, $1,-700. The contention of the defendant that the amounts set opposite the several classes of property in the schedule, and aggregating $90,-000, was, in effect, an agreement that a total insurance of that amount should be maintained upon the property, and that its liability should be only in the proportion of $2,000 to $90,000, cannot be sustained. No such agreement is expressed, and there is no sufficient ground for a legal implication to that effect. Indeed, it is more reasonable to say that the policy leaves it wholly to the option of the assured to determine what amount of other insurance he would carry. “Privilege to make other insurance without notice” is given. This would certainly allow the assured to take out more than $90,000'' of insurance, and that is inconsistent with the theory of the defendant that the agreement contemplates the specific sum of $90,000 as the total amount of the insurance. Our conclusion that the defendant is liable to the extent of one-thirtieth of the loss is in accordance with the decisions in Illinois Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hoffman, in the appellate court of Illinois, reported in 22 Chic. Leg. News, 84, and in Hoffman, v. Mfrs. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 487, both of which cases were actions by this same plaintiff to recover for this same Iobs, and upon policies like that now before us.

    Order reversed.'

• source_sentence: Procedures for appealing a District Court judgment regarding public works projects sentences:

  • 'Ernst Albrecht et al. vs. City of St. Paul et al.

    Submitted on briefs Nov. 29, 1893.

    Affirmed Jan. 2, 1894.

    No. 8523.

    Insufficient assignment of errors.

    The assignments of error made by counsel for appellants in this case are insufficient to raise or present any question for determination.

    Appeal by plaintiffs, Ernst Albrecht and two hundred and fifteen others, from a judgment of the District Court of Bamsey County, Chas. E. Otis, J., entered October 19, 1892, that they take nothing by their action.

    This suit was commenced January 26, 1891, against the City of St. Paul and George Bies, City Treasurer, defendants, to restrain the levy and collection of an assessment upon the property of the plaintiffs for the construction of a bridge and approaches on Selby Avenue over the tracks and right of way of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Bailway Company, costing $90,646.73. The plaiiftiffs claimed the bridge was in fact for the use and benefit of Selby Avenue Cable Line belonging to the St. Paul City Bailway Company, and was in no sense a local or public improvement, that the assessment was in several particulars illegal and they prayed judgment enjoining its collection. The defendants, by their answer denied various allegations of the complaint, and then set forth in detail all the steps in the proceeding to levy and collect the assessment, comprising more than ten folios of affirmative statements. The issues were tried February 10, 1892, and the Court made findings that all the affirmative allegations in the answer are true, and directed judgment that plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief in the action and that they pay the costs. Judgment was so entered and plaintiffs appeal. Here they assign errors as follows:

    1st. The Court below erred in finding the affirmative allegations of the answer to be true.

    2nd. The Court below erred in finding as conclusion of law that plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief in this action.

    John W. White and F. W. Root, for appellants.

    Leon T. Chamberlain and H. W. Phillips, for respondents.

    Collins, J.

    Plaintiffs’ first assignment of error is not only too general to indicate in what particular the finding of fact complained of is erroneous, but it covers many facts which were not only alleged in the complaint, but, after being set out with much detail in the answer, were expressly admitted in the reply. It does not reach that part of the findings of fact attacked in appellants’ brief whereby the court found that the allegations of the complaint respecting the real character and purpose of the improvements, and that they were actually made for a private, and not a public, use, were untrue. If the findings of fact remain intact, it follows that there is nothing in the second assignment of error as to the conclusions of law.

    Judgment affirmed.

    (Opinion published 57 N. "W. Rep. 330.)'

  • 'Ted GRADJELICK et al., Petitioners, Appellants, v. Leland HANCE et al., Respondents, Connie Jo Klosterman, Respondent.

    No. C4-00-2161.

    Supreme Court of Minnesota.

    June 27, 2002.

    Andrew S. Birrell, R. Travis Snider, Bir-rell & Newmark, Ltd., Minneapolis, for Appellant.

    Jerome B. Abrams, Lisa M. Lamm, Abrams <& Smith, P.A., Minneapolis, for Respondent Hance.

    Timothy J. Leer, Johnson & Condon, P.A., Minneapolis, for Respondent Kloster-man.

    OPINION

    ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice.

    Appellants Ted and Niki Gradjelick brought a negligence action against respondents Leland and Patricia Hance and respondent Connie Jo Klosterman for injuries arising out of an apartment building fire. The Gradjelicks’ suit is based on the Hances’ alleged knowledge of building and fire code violations and unsafe conditions. The Hances brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing that they had no actual or constructive knowledge of any fire code violations. The district court granted the Hances’ motion and dismissed the Gradjelicks’ action on the grounds that the Hances relied upon an official building inspection report. The Gradjelicks appealed and the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed. The court of appeals concluded that a landowner relying on an official inspection lacks constructive knowledge of code violations and therefore cannot be liable in an ordinary negligence action or in an action based on negligence per se. We reverse.

    Leland Hance purchased a mixed-use building at 204 Water Street in Excelsior, Minnesota in 1982. During all times relevant to this case, the first floor of this building was occupied by a hardware store and the second floor consisted of nine residential apartments. The Gradjelicks and Connie Jo Klosterman were tenants of the Hances and occupied units two and nine, respectively. These units were located directly across the common hallway from each other. The Hances lived in Colorado at the time of the fire and since 1992 have employed a manager for the apartments.

    On April 25, 1999, at approximately 6:30 a.m., the Gradjelicks awoke to the smell of smoke coming from the hallway. Mr. Gradjeliek looked out their front door and discovered that the building was on fire. Mrs. Gradjeliek called 911, opened their bedroom window, and waited for firefighters to help them evacuate. After the firefighters arrived, Mr. Gradjeliek watched as they helped his wife out of the window. While he was waiting to be helped down the ladder, he felt intense heat on his back and was “forced” to fall out of the window. He fell to the ground, suffering a multiple compound fracture of his right leg, a severe cut on his foot from heel to toe, injuries to his back and knee, and first-degree burns on his back and legs.

    Later that morning, after the fire was put out, a Deputy State Fire Marshal Investigator inspected the building and concluded that the fire started when Klosterman fell asleep while smoking. Klosterman had apparently been drinking heavily the night before and, when tested that morning, had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.34. Klosterman was subsequently charged with negligent fire, a felony under Minn.Stat. § 609.576, subd. 1(b)(3) (2000).

    The Gradjelicks brought a negligence action against the Hances and Klosterman in Hennepin County District Court. They alleged that (1) the fire was caused by Klosterman’s negligence, (2) the Hances negligently maintained the premises, and (3)Klosterman’s and the Hances’ negligence was the proximate cause of their injuries. Both the Gradjelicks and Klost-erman retained separate experts to investigate the fire. In an affidavit, the Gradjel-icks’ expert, Robert Schroeder, concluded that the building did not meet the requirements of the 1997 Uniform Fire Code. Specifically, Schroeder noted the following conditions:

    (1) failure to eliminate or adequately cover transom openings;

    (2) unrated doors in the common hallway;

    (3) windows from the Gradjelicks’ unit to the hallway did not contain rated wire glass;

    (4) no self-closing mechanism on the door to Klosterman’s unit; and

    (5) improper wainscoting treatment in common hallway.

    Schroeder stated that, in his opinion, but for these conditions the fire could have been contained in Klosterman’s apartment.

    In a separate statement, Klosterman’s expert, John Slanga, noted similar conditions and code violations in Klosterman’s apartment that in his opinion led to the spread of the fire from Klosterman’s apartment. These conditions and violations included:

    (1) no smoke detector in Klosterman’s unit;

    (2) improper paneled-over window from Klosterman’s kitchen to unit # 8;

    (3) improper glass transom between Klosterman’s unit and hallway;

    (4) improper door between Klosterman’s unit and hallway;

    (5) no self-closing mechanism on door to Klosterman’s unit; and

    (6) no “positive latching” on door to Klosterman’s unit.

    Additionally, Slanga noted other dangerous conditions and code violations in the hallway that affected safety and escape, including:

    (1) improper fire resistance rating in the hallway due to glass windows and transoms;

    (2) no required smoke barrier partitions;

    (3) improperly installed smoke detectors (18 inches below ceiling);

    (4) unrated hallway doors (below 20 minute construction);

    (5) “flame spread rating” of means of egress excessive (not Class A or B);

    (6) no self-closing mechanisms on hallway doors; and

    (7) no exit signs.

    Slanga also indicated that proper installation of the smoke detectors could have been performed by reading the installation instructions. According to Slanga, because the installation distance of 18 inches below the ceiling was improper, the detectors were ineffective due to delayed operation.

    The Gradjelicks commenced discovery and, although they argue that their discovery was not complete by the time of the summary judgment motion, they were able to obtain some relevant information from the Hances. Specifically, the Gradjelicks learned that there had been no structural renovations of the building during the period of the Hances’ ownership until the fire — 1982 to 1999. But during this time the Hances had made several repairs, including (1) hardwiring the electrical system for the smoke detectors in the hallway, and (2) replacing a pane of broken glass in an interior hallway window in the Gradjelicks’ apartment.

    Based on this discovery information, as well as on the complaint, Slanga’s statement, and Schroeder’s affidavit, the Grad-jelicks argue that the transformation of the building from office space to residential failed to create a secure hallway. They assert that there was an unsafe condition in violation of the applicable building and fire codes and, because the Hances made subsequent repairs, the Hances were aware of this unsafe condition. Additionally, the Gradjelicks assert that there was a missing smoke detector in Klosterman’s apartment.

    The Hances moved for summary judgment, arguing that they had no actual or constructive knowledge of any dangerous conditions or code violations at the time of the fire. They contend that they lived in Colorado, had no independent knowledge of the fire code, and instead relied on an annual building inspection and communications from their property manager, Troy Stottler, regarding any unsafe conditions or code violations. The Hances submitted several affidavits in support of their motion for summary judgment, including affidavits from Stottler, Leland Hance, and Excelsior’s Fire Marshal, Scott Anding.

    According to these affidavits, Excelsior requires properties to pass an annual building inspection by the fire department in order to obtain a multiple dwellings permit for commercial rental properties. The annual inspection is made to determine whether the property meets the requirements of the Uniform Fire Code. According to Anding, Excelsior adopted the 1997 Uniform Fire Code in 1998. However, Anding stated that the city interprets the code to require that nonconforming structural conditions in buildings that ex isted when the code was adopted be corrected only upon commencement of new construction. Anding also stated that, in his annual building inspections, he looks for conditions that can be corrected without construction activity. If no such conditions exist, it is Anding’s standard practice to issue an annual permit.

    The record reveals that three months before the fire, Anding inspected the Hances’ building. Anding found no code violations that could be corrected without construction activity and issued the multiple dwellings permit. Additionally, And-ing prepared a one-page summary of his inspection in which he indicated “No Hazards Observed.” He gave the inspection report to Stottler. The record further shows that, from the date of the inspection in January until the time of the fire in April, no complaints regarding unsafe conditions in the building were communicated to Anding, Stottler, or the Hances.

    The Gradjelieks presented two main arguments in opposition to the summary judgment motion. First, they argued that the Hances knew or should have known of the defective conditions. Specifically, they asserted that the Hances knew or should have known about the conditions because the defects were numerous and obvious and that the Hances were directly involved with some of the defects, including the installation of the electrical system for the smoke detectors and repairing a window in the Gradjelieks’ apartment. The Gradjel-icks argued that the Hances cannot rely on the inspection report revealing no violations because the Hances were directly involved with the defective conditions. In their second main argument, the Gradjel-icks argued that summary judgment was inappropriate because discovery was not complete.

    The district court granted the Hances’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Gradjelieks failed to show that the Hances had actual or constructive knowledge of the code violations. The court concluded that, under Bills v. Willow Run I Apartments, 547 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Minn.1996), the Hances were relieved of any duty to “re-inspeet” the building for hazards after receipt of the Fire Marshal’s inspection report and receipt of the multiple dwellings permit. Additionally, the court noted that the Hances fully relied on the inspection report and had no independent knowledge of the applicable building code.

    The Gradjelieks appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals concluded that the district court applied the correct legal standard from Bills. Specifically, the court of appeals concluded that a landowner relying on an official inspection lacks constructive knowledge of code violations, both in an ordinary negligence action and in negligence per se. The Gradjelieks then petitioned this court for review of the court of appeals’ decision.

    I.

    On appeal from summary judgment, we must determine whether the lower courts applied the correct legal standard and whether there are genuine issues of material fact for trial. DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn.1997). In a negligence action, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment when the record reflects a complete lack of proof on any of the four essential elements of the claim: (1) the existence of a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) an injury, and (4) the breach of the duty being the proximate cause of the injury. Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn.1995). A non-moving party cannot defeat a summary judgment motion with unverified and con-clusory allegations or by postulating evidence that might be developed at trial. See id. Instead, if the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on an issue, that party must present sufficient evidence to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions. DLH, 566 N.W.2d at 71. When reviewing a summary judgment ruling, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortg. Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 542 (Minn.2001).

    We first address whether the district court applied the correct legal standard. Minnesota follows the common law rule that landlords are generally not hable — have no duty of care — to tenants for damages caused by defective conditions on the premises. See, e.g., Johnson v. O’Brien, 258 Minn. 502, 504-06, 105 N.W.2d 244, 246-47 (1960); Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 417, 35 N.W.2d 719, 726 (1949). Several exceptions apply to this common law rule. The exception most applicable to the facts of this case is the hidden dangerous condition exception. This exception creates a duty of care in the landlord such that the landlord may be liable to tenants for breach of that duty when there is a hidden dangerous condition on the premises of which the landlord is aware, but the tenant is not. Breimhorst, 227 Minn. at 417, 35 N.W.2d at 726. Further, a landlord’s awareness of a hidden dangerous condition is not limited to actual knowledge. Instead, we have slightly expanded common law landlord liability, holding that a landlord may be liable to a tenant for defective conditions on the premises if the landlord should have known of the danger and if the tenant, exercising due care, would not discover the danger. Johnson, 258 Minn. at 506, 105 N.W.2d at 247 (holding that constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition is also a basis for landlord liability).

    Another exception potentially applicable to the facts of this case is the “common area” exception.

    A landlord who retains possession and control of stairways and similar building facilities for the common use of the tenants therein, although not an insurer of the safety of these facilities, owes a duty of exercising ordinary care to see that such stairways and facilities are originally constructed and subsequently maintained in a reasonably safe condition for the use of tenants who are themselves exercising ordinary care.

    Nubbe v. Hardy Cont’l Hotel Sys. of Minnesota, Inc., 225 Minn. 496, 499, 31 N.W.2d 332, 334 (1948) (emphasis in original). We also recognize that a landlord owes a duty of care to tenants when the landlord repairs the premises. See, e.g., Canada By and Through Landy v. McCarthy, 567 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn.1997) (citing Wood v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 212 Minn. 551, 4 N.W.2d 617 (1942)).

    We have recognized that landlords may be liable under a theory of negligence per se for violations of applicable building or fire codes if the persons harmed by the violation are within the intended protection of the code and if the harm suffered is of the type the code was intended to prevent. Alderman’s, Inc. v. Shanks, 536 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Minn.1995). However, we have restricted situations in which violation of the Uniform Building Code (UBC) will result in negligence per se for landlords. Bills, 547 N.W.2d at 695.

    In Bills, a tenant who fell on an icy landing sued his landlord under a negligence per se theory for violation of the UBC. 547 N.W.2d at 693-94. The tenant alleged that the handrails and risers on the landing violated the UBC and were the proximate cause of his injuries. Id. at 694. In our decision, we adopted a new standard for landlord liability governing violations of the UBC in negligence per se actions, holding that a landlord is not negligent per se for code violations unless the following four elements are present:

    (1) the landlord or owner knew or should have known of the Code violation;

    (2) the landlord or owner failed to take reasonable steps to remedy the violation;

    (3) the injury suffered was the kind the Code was meant to prevent; and

    (4) the violation was the proximate cause of the injury or damage.

    Id. at 695.

    The tenant in Bills did not offer any evidence that the landlord knew of the violations other than the fact of the code violation itself. Id. Further, we noted that the landlord reasonably relied on the reports of a state building inspector. Id. at 694. We then implied that a landlord has no duty to “re-inspect” buildings after a favorable inspection and may reasonably rely upon a state building inspector’s inspection report and occupancy permit regarding the premises’ safety. Id. at 694-95. Because the tenant in Bills did not present evidence that showed the landlord’s knowledge of the code violation, we affirmed the district court’s directed verdict for the landlord. Id. at 695. Implicit in our holding was that the mere fact of a code violation does not constitute constructive knowledge of the violation.

    The Gradjelicks argue that the district court and the court of appeals misconstrued Bills and improperly extended its holding from the negligence per se context to ordinary negligence. Specifically, the Gradjelicks argue that while reliance on an inspector’s report may preclude liability in negligence per se under Bills, a proper interpretation of Bills does not allow a court to conclude that the Gradjelicks are unable to show the Hances’ knowledge of code violations under an ordinary negligence theory. The Hances argue that the lower courts’ application of Bills was proper. Accordingly, we must examine in some detail how those courts construed Bills.

    The district court began its analysis by correctly stating Minnesota’s general standard for landlord liability for defective conditions. The court also correctly stated the negligence per se standard from Bills regarding code violations. However, when ruling on the summary judgment motion, it appears that the court only analyzed the elements of negligence per se instead of considering the elements of an ordinary negligence claim as well. Thus, it appears that the district court erred in its interpretation and application of Bills.

    In its analysis, the district court confused and failed to separate the liability standards for ordinary negligence and for negligence per se. The court acknowledged the Gradjelicks’ allegations of several code violations and their allegation that the Hances improperly installed the. fire alarms. But when citing Bills, the court made the following statement, “Plaintiffs have failed to show that Defendants knew or should have known of any fire code violations, and that is a crucial element to Plaintiffs claim under Minnesota law.” (Emphasis added.) This statement is misleading. Actual or constructive knowledge of code violations is a required element of a negligence per se claim for UBC violations under Bills, but actual or constructive knowledge of code violations is not a required element in an ordinary negligence claim. Under the hidden dangerous condition exception to the general standard of landlord liability noted above, plaintiffs are required to show a landlord’s actual, or constructive knowledge of a hidden dangerous condition. Such hidden dangerous conditions may include, but are not limited to, code violations; therefore, the district court was in error when it stated that the Hances’ actual or constructive knowledge of a code violation was a “crucial element” of the Gradjelicks’ claim under Minnesota law.

    The district court also failed to consider other exceptions upon which landlord liability can be founded in ordinary negligence, including the “common area” and “negligent repair” exceptions. Neither of these exceptions requires actual or constructive knowledge of a code violation. See Canada, 567 N.W.2d at 504 (addressing the negligent repair ■ exception); Nubbe, 225 Minn. at 499, 31 N.W.2d at 334 (addressing the common area exception). Instead, the only required elements to establish a claim under these exceptions are duty, breach, causation, and damages — the elements of ordinary negligence. See Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149, 157 (Minn.1982). Thus, to the extent that the court required actual or constructive knowledge of a code violation as a prerequisite to landlord liability, it erred. Specifically, the court applied the incorrect legal standard, conflating the ordinary negligence and negligence per se standards in the context of landlord liability. This error was compounded when the court of appeals apparently accepted the district court’s analysis, concluding that “if the facts alleged failed to fulfill the knowledge requirement under negligence per se theory, identical facts asserted as common law negligence likewise fail.” Gradjelick v. Hance, 627 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Minn.App.2001).

    While both the district court and the court, of appeals used Bills to support their conclusions, they have incorrectly interpreted our holding. In Bills, we only discussed and applied a standard regarding negligence per se. 547 N.W.2d at 695. We did not indicate that we were developing the - law regarding ordinary negligence, nor did we comment on how UBC violations should be analyzed under an ordinary negligence theory. We only intended to bring the negligence per se analysis for landlord violations of the UBC more in line with the standard used for ordinary negligence in landlord liability, rather than creating a rule that UBC violations must always be analyzed under negligence per se. ■ See id. Accordingly, we added a requirement already present in ordinary negligence claims for landlord/tenant liability for hidden dangerous conditions — a requirement for actual or constructive knowledge of the condition. Id. We also concluded that we would not impute constructive knowledge of a code violation to the landlord; instead, we indicated that a landlord’s reasonable reliance on an official inspection report and occupancy permit may prevent a finding of constructive knowledge. Id. at 694. However, we did not hold that we intended for a negligence per se analysis to supplant an analysis under ordinary negligence. A separate analysis is necessary under each theory because the elements are different. Actual or constructive knowledge of code violations is a required element under negligence per se, but actual or constructive knowledge of hidden dangerous conditions is a required element under the hidden dangerous conditions theory of ordinary negligence and such conditions are not coextensive with code violations.

    To summarize- our analysis, we conclude that (1) Bills articulated a standard for negligence per se based on UBC violations; (2) Bills did not create a unified standard such that allegations of code violations must be analyzed only under negligence per se; and (3) analyses under negligence per se according to Bills and ordinary common law negligence are both available in landlord liability cases when UBC violations are alleged. Therefore, the district court erred because it analyzed only whether the Gradjelicks were able to satisfy the elements of negligence per se under Bills instead of analyzing the Grad-jelicks’ claim under an ordinary negligence theory. Accordingly, we hold that the court of appeals erred when it concluded that it was “unable to articulate a principled distinction between per se and common law negligence theories for the purposes of this analysis.” Gradjelick, 627 N.W.2d at 713.

    II.

    Having clarified the proper legal standards applicable to the Gradjelicks’ Claims, we next determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute regarding the material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law applicable to such facts. DLH, 566 N.W.2d at 69. Accordingly, the Gradjel-icks must have presented sufficient evidence regarding a material fact to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions in order to survive summary judgment. Id. at 71. On the other hand, the Hances are entitled to summary judgment when the record reflects a complete lack of proof on any of the four essential elements of the ordinary negligence claim: (1) the existence of a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) an injury, and (4) the breach of the duty being the proximate cause of the injury. See Lubbers, 539 N.W.2d at 401. Similarly, the Hances are entitled to summary judgment if there is a complete lack of proof on any of the essential elements of their negligence per se claim: (1) the landlord or owner knew or should have known of the code violation; (2) the landlord or owner failed to take reasonable steps to remedy the violation; (3) the injury suffered was the kind the code was meant to prevent; and (4) the violation was the proximate cause of the injury or damage. See Bills, 547 N.W.2d at 695.

    Ordinarily, we would separately examine whether there were disputed facts under each claim and make a ruling on whether summary judgment was appropriate. In this case, however, a remand to the district court is more appropriate. While the correct legal standard appears to have been applied with respect to negligence per se, we remand because the lower courts did not apply the correct legal standard to the Gradjelicks’ separate ordinary negligence claims. Therefore, rather than rule only on part of the Gradjelicks’ total claims, we remand for application of the correct legal standards in light of the facts alleged.

    Reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

    . In addition to the 1997 Uniform Fire Code, the Gradjelicks also assert that there were violations of the National Fire Protection Association 101 life-safety code and the Uniform Building Code.

    . The parties refer to Slanga''s statement as an "affidavit,” but we note that Slanga’s statement is neither sworn nor notarized. At oral argument, counsel for the Gradjelicks admitted that the statement was neither sworn nor notarized, but explained that it was signed, presented, and relied upon by both the district court and the court of appeals.

    . A per se negligence rule substitutes a statutory standard of care for the ordinary prudent person standard of care, such that a violation of a statute (or an ordinance or regulation adopted under statutory authority) is conclusive evidence of duty and breach. See, e.g., Alderman’s, Inc. v. Shanks, 536 N.W.2d 4, 7-10 (Minn.1995) (addressing fire codes specifically); Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 810 (Minn.1981) (explaining negligence per se).

    . The court cited Broughton v. Maes, 378 N.W.2d 134 (Minn.App.1985), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1986). In Broughton, the court of appeals discussed the principle that landlords generally are not liable to tenants for damages caused by defective conditions on the premises. Id. at 135. The court also discussed several exceptions to this rule, in-eluding (1) hidden dangerous condition; (2) common area; and (3) negligent repair. Id. The court also discussed an exception when land is leased for purposes involving admission of the public. Id. The case before us does not involve land leased for admission of the public.

    . It should be noted that the district court''s order and memorandum are not completely silent regarding the correct standard. The introduction to the court’s memorandum refers to both code violations and hazardous conditions, but the analysis consistently focuses on and specifically refers only to code violations.'

  • 'LENORA K. GLASSER v. GEORGE O’BRIEN AND OTHERS.

    October 7, 1927.

    No. 26,162.

    R. J. Powell, for appellant.

    Denegre, McDermott, Stearns & Stone, for respondents.

    Reported in 215 N. W. 517.

    Holt, J.

    The appeal is from an order denying a new trial after a Verdict for defendants.

    The action ivas in conversion. Plaintiff’s ownership of and right of possession to 44 horses, a pair of mules, 23 sets of harness,, and 46 blankets, valued at $8,000, which she alleges defendant seized and converted on May 7, 1923, is through a chattel mortgage executed to her by the Dakota Central Construction Company, a South Dakota corporation. Defendant as sheriff of Itasca county, Minnesota, justified under a. writ of attachment directed against property of the mortgagor, the Dakota Central Construction Company. When plaintiff served her claim of ownership upon the sheriff, plaintiff in the attachment proceeding, the Chicago Box & Crating Company, gave the statutory bond to the sheriff, who retained the levy, and this action resulted. The Chicago Box & Crating Company and its surety were subsequently impleaded as defendants. The Chicago Box & Crating Company will hereinafter be referred to as the Chicago company, and the Dakota Central Construction Company as the Dakota company. ''

    Plaintiff’s. chattel mortgage was executed on January 16, 1923, and purported to secure the payment of three promissory notes of the following amounts and dates, viz. one for $100, dated March 4, 1922; one for $900, dated May 6, 1922; and one for $3,500, dated January 16, 1923, each note being due on demand. The mortgage was duly filed on January 31, 1923, in the county where the property was.

    The claim under the attachment arises under these facts: The Chicago company owned considerable timber in Itasca county, and in December, 1922, entered into a contract with the Dakota company to log the same. Under that contract active hauling of the logs was to begin not later than January 1, 1923, and the Dakota company was to give the Chicago company a surety bond of $15,000 for the faithful performance of the contract before any payments thereunder should be made to the Dakota company. In February, 1923, the Chicago company brought an action against the Dakota company for breach of the contract, wherein it was alleged that the latter had failed to begin hauling as agreed, had refused to furnish the surety bond required, that the Chicago company had advanced to the Dakota company $4,000, and that the latter threatened to. abandon the contract and all attempts to perform it and ship its horses and equipment out of the state. Damages were alleged in the amount of $75,000, and ah injunction was sought to restrain the Dakota company from abandoning the contract and from removing its property. It obtained a temporary restraining order which was later discharged. Thereafter, and on April 23, 1923, the plaintiff in that action, the Chicago company, procured the writ of attachment under which the defendant herein levied upon and justifies holding the property described in the chattel mortgage.

    The main contentions in the appeal turn upon the correctness of the trial court’s view of two issues submitted to the jury, and whether there was evidence supporting a finding in favor of defendants on both; for if there was a failure as to either the general verdict cannot stand, namely: Was the Chicago company a creditor and was it such so as to require plaintiff to prove “that such mortgage was executed in good faith, and not for the purpose of hindering, delaying or defrauding any creditor of the mortgagor,” as prescribed by G-. S. 1923, § 8345.

    In this case the mortgagor retained possession of the property mortgaged which was seized under the writ after the mortgage was properly filed. The mortgagee assails the right of an alleged creditor in possession. The defendants (the sheriff, the impleaded creditor, the Chicago company and its bondsman) introduced the pleadings and files in the attachment suit and also evidence of the contract referred to, its breach, and the fact that $4,000 had been paid to the Dakota company by the Chicago company, when under the terms of the contract no payments were due, and that no part had been repaid. No damages other than would result from the failure to repay the $4,000 loaned or advanced by the Chicago company was proved. We think that amount at least recoverable in the action on the showing made in this record. So there ivas proof that the Chicago company was a creditor in fact; and under the attachment it ivas in possession of the property “armed with legal process” able to claim the benefit of § 8345. Singer v. Farmers State Bank of Goodridge, 166 Minn. 327, 207 N. W. 631. This stat ute does not speak of existing or subsequent creditors, but of course refers to a creditor who has laid hold of the property and is in possession thereof when the mortgagor in a chattel mortgage, who did not obtain possession of the property when the mortgage was made, asserts ownership or right of possession thereto.

    But plaintiff makes the claim that the Chicago company’s action was for equitable relief and the attachment unauthorized, and at any rate, it sought and obtained a temporary injunction'' or equitable relief and is precluded from demanding a money judgment. There is no merit in this. The'' temporary injunction was vacated before the affidavit for attachment was made. And clearly the action is one for the recovery of a money judgment. Our attachment statute is very broad. G. S. 1923, §§ 9342, 9343.

    Again there is asserted to be a fatal variance between the cause of action stated in the complaint and the one stated in the affidavit for attachment. The only material variance is that the affidavit contains no reference to the $4,000 advanced to the Dakota company by the Chicago company. But Ave see no reason Avhy, under the testimony, a recovery on account thereof could not be had in the action. We think it Avas not necessary to prove all the damages recoverable in order to give the Chicago company a standing as a creditor in the present-action. The action in the attachment suit being for the recovery of money from the defendant therein and. it being a foreign corporation, there was a valid ground for the writ. It may be questioned whether an attaching creditor, defending against a mortgagee claiming the property without ever having had possession thereof, is not as a matter of law a creditor so as to place the burden of proof stated in § 8345 upon the mortgagee without other proof than possession taken under an attachment proceeding valid on its face. But it is not necessary to a determination of the instant case to pass on that point.

    Appellant presents a very ingenious argument, to the effect that the revision of 1905 made such a change in the language of G. S. 1923, § 8345, that prior decisions of this court, such as Braley v. Byrnes, 25 Minn. 297, are no longer binding authorities. But in First Nat. Bank of Beaver Creek v. Wiggins, 154 Minn. 84, 191 N. W. 264, it was expressly held that the change in the language of the section mentioned in the revision did not alter the meaning of the law as it had been construed prior thereto. It is further urged that the uniform fraudulent conveyance act, L. 1921, p. 642, c. 415 (G. S. 1923, §§ 8475-8489), has superseded or repealed by implication § 8345.

    . We find nothing in c. 415 which is antagonistic to or inconsistent with the provisions of § 8345. Section 8467, G-. S. 1923, is expressly left in force, which presumes every sale by a vendor of goods or chattels, when there is not an immediate change of possession, fraudulent and void as against creditors of the vendor unless it is made to appear that it was made in good faith and without any intent to hinder, delay or defraud such creditors. This section creates a rebuttable presumption in case of a sale of chattels. Tousley v. First Nat. Bank of Pine City, 155 Minn. 162, 193 N. W. 38. And no more is created by § 8345 in case of a mortgage of chattels. And it is fair to assume that when the legislature expressly indicated that one should remain there should be held no repeal of the other which never was a part of the chapter in respect to fraudulent conveyances, as was § 8467.

    We think the legal steps the Chicago company took to lay hold of the property plaintiff claims under her mortgage were ade quate, and that the testimony was uncontradicted that when it so did it was a Creditor. There was no evidence contradicting a breach by the Dakota company of its contract with the Chicago company, or that the money advanced had been repaid, or that work had been done under the contract so as to constitute payment in-whole or in part. ’

    Hence, no error can be predicated upon the submission to the jury of the issue of the Chicago company’s being a creditor.

    Does the evidence sustain the finding, included in the verdict, that plaintiff did not prove that her mortgage was executed in good faith and not for the purpose of hindering, delaying or defrauding any creditor. Plaintiff did not testify. Her husband was at the trial and called for cross-examination. He was at all times the president of the Dakota company. Plaintiff did not see fit to have him testify relative to the consideration of the chattel mortgage or the circumstances leading up to its execution. The mortgage was given after the breach of the contract with the Chicago company.

    At the same time the chattel mortgage in question was received plaintiff also received another mortgage on all other property of the Dakota company within this state. These mortgages were not filed until after the Chicago company had advanced some of its money on the strength of the representations of the husband Of plaintiff that the equipment of the company was wholly free of encumbrances, when as a matter of fact both of his wife’s mortgages had been executed, and there also existed unsatisfied mortgages in South Dakota upon part of the property herein involved. The jury had ample grounds for finding actual fraud and an attempt to cover up all property from the reach of the Chicago company. Plaintiff’s intent and purpose not to hinder, delay or defraud the Chicago company was for her to prove; and as neither she nor anyone who acted for her, if such there were, in the transaction with the Dakota company, testified, the jury could take that fact into consideration. Indeed, where a party upon whom is the burden to prove good faith and an intent not to defraud fails to take the witness stand, no great fault can be found with the triers of fact who find that burden of proof has not been sustained. We see no reversible error in receiving evidence of the giving to plaintiff [of] another mortgage covering the balance of the mortgagor’s property in this state at the same time that she took the one directly involved here.

    The same is true of the South Dakota mortgages although their bearing was of much less consequence, they not running to plaintiff, and were admissible only to show fraud on the part of her husband when assuring the Chicago company that the equipment of the Dakota company was free of encumbrances.

    We do not understand appellant to question the correctness of the court’s charge with respect to the burden of proof if § 8345 is still in force and to be interpreted as by our decisions prior to the revision of 1905 and the enactment of L. 1921, p. 642, c. 415.

    For reasons stated we find no reversible error in the record.

    The order is affirmed.

    Stone, J., took no part.'

• source_sentence: Minnesota court ruling on co-owned farm division sentences:

  • 'ELLEN BRANDIN v. JASPER SWENSON.

    June 19, 1925.

    No 24,681.

    8. H. Écfanqn, for appellant.

    John Heitmarm, for respondent.

    Reported in 204 N. W. 468.

    Dibell, J.

    Action in St. Louis county to have the plaintiff adjudged to be the owner of an 80-acre tract of land, and, if such relief were denied, that the land be partitioned. There was judgment for a partition in specie, and the plaintiff appeals.

    The evidence is not returned. The only question, as correctly stated by counsel for appellant, is whether the findings of fact justify the judgment; and in stating the facts we follow the findings of the trial court.

    A marriage ceremony'' was performed between the plaintiff, Ellen Brandin, and the defendant, Jasper Swenson, on February 10, 1906. At that time the plaintiff had a husband living. He had deserted her 10 years before and she and the defendant supposed that he was dead. In 1920 it was ascertained that he was living; and on January 8, 1922, a judgment was entered annuling the marriage of the plaintiff and defendant.

    On April 9, 1906, the plaintiff and the defendant purchased an 80-acre tract as tenants in common and the deed ran to both. The purchase price was paid by the plaintiff, but a part thereof the defendant had given her from his earnings subsequent to their formal marriage, and not long afterwards he gave her money exceeding his one-half of the purchase price. In 1907 the defendant moved upon the land and has since lived there and improved one forty. The plaintiff continued living in Duluth, operating a boarding house. She contributed to the improvement of the farm, and received cash and products from it. The court set off to her the west forty of the eighty, and to the defendant the east forty upon which he had made the improvements. This was done on the basis of its finding that the value of the west forty was to the value contributed by the plaintiff approximately as was the value-of the east forty to the amount contributed by the defendant. This was an equitable division. Each got one-half in area of the land. The defendant got''the forty upon which he had improved. Each got a value proportionate to contribution. The principles stated in Hunt v. Meeker County A. & L. Co. 135 Minn. 134, 160 N. W. 496, sustain the division. With the record as it is, neither the form of the pleadings nor the procedure adopted is important. No complaint is made of either.

    Judgment affirmed.'

  • 'STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Charles William ZORNES, Appellant.

    No. C6-98-54.

    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

    Sept. 22, 1998.

    Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, Nancy J. Bode, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, and Joseph Evans, Becker County Attorney, Detroit Lakes, for respondent.

    John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Lyonel Norris, Assistant State Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.

    Considered and decided by KALITOWSKI, P.J., AMUNDSON and WILLIS, JJ.

    OPINION

    WILLIS, Judge.

    Appellant Charles Zornes challenges his conviction for driving after cancellation of his license as inimical to public safety, contending that the state lacks jurisdiction to enforce the applicable statute against a member of an American Indian tribe on reservation land. We affirm.

    FACTS

    On March 6, 1997, a Becker County sheriffs deputy on routine patrol saw a car stopped on the shoulder of a road on the White Earth Indian Reservation. The car was in neutral gear with the engine running. Appellant Charles Zornes, an enrolled member of the Wdiite Earth Band of Ojibwe who resides on the reservation, was asleep or passed out behind the wheel. The deputy administered field sobriety tests, which Zornes failed. A breath test showed that Zornes’s alcohol concentration was .09, but a license check disclosed that Zornes’s driver’s license had been cancelled as inimical to public safety following his sixth DWI conviction.

    Zornes was charged with a gross misdemeanor count of driving after cancellation. He moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that Minnesota does not have jurisdiction over such an offense when committed on a reservation by a tribal member. The district court denied the motion, and the parties submitted the case on stipulated facts, while preserving Zornes’s right to appeal the jurisdiction issue. The court found Zornes guilty and sentenced him to probation and a fine, staying the sentence for six months pending this appeal. We affirm.

    ISSUE

    Did the district court err in concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the offense of driving after cancellation of a license for public safety reasons when the offense was committed by a tribal member on a reservation?

    ANALYSIS

    The existence of jurisdiction is a legal question, which this court reviews de novo. State v. Stone, 557 N.W.2d 588, 590 (Minn.App.1996), aff''d, 572 N.W.2d 725 (Minn.1997).

    The supreme court provides an extensive discussion of the legal framework relevant to this case in its Stone opinion. Tribal sovereignty is subordinate only to the federal government, not to the states, absent an express delegation of power by Congress or certain exceptional circumstances. Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 728, 731 (citing California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207, 215, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 1087, 1091, 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987)). But Congress, in a 1953 enactment known as Public Law 280, has expressly delegated to Minnesota criminal jurisdiction over most of the reservation territory within the state. Id. at 728-29 (citing Pub.L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588, 588-89 (1953) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 25, and 28 U.S.C.)). The purpose of this grant of authority was to combat a perceived problem of lawlessness on certain reservations that lacked adequate tribal law enforcement. Id. at 729 (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 2106, 48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976)). But Public Law 280 does not allow enforcement of all state civil or regulatory laws, even if those laws provide for criminal penalties. Id. (citing Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 209, 107 S.Ct. at 1088). As stated by the United States Supreme Court,

    if the intent of a state law is generally to prohibit certain conduct, it falls within Pub.L. 280’s grant of criminal jurisdiction, but if the state law generally permits the conduct at issue, subject to regulation, it must be classified as civil/regulatory and Pub.L. 280 does not authorize its enforcement on an Indian reservation. The shorthand test is whether the conduct at issue violates the State’s public policy.

    Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 209, 107 S.Ct. at 1088. The Supreme Court in Cabazon Band-concluded that gambling, and in particular bingo, was a regulated rather than a prohibited activity in California and that Public Law 280 therefore did not grant California authority to enforce on reservation territory its statutes regulating bingo.

    As the Minnesota Supreme Court has noted,

    [t]he Cabazon test admits of some ambiguity. The Supreme Court did not clearly state whether the “conduct at issue” to be analyzed is the broad conduct, such as gambling, or the narrow conduct, such as bingo. This distinction becomes crucial when the broad conduct is generally permitted, but the narrow conduct is generally prohibited.

    Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 729. Stone is a consolidated case concerning the state’s jurisdiction over a number of traffic offenses committed on the White Earth reservation. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected a “rigid” application of either a broad standard, under which all traffic statutes would be considered as regulation of the generally permitted conduct of driving, or a narrow standard, under which each offense would be considered as a discrete form of prohibited conduct. Rather, the court concluded that “[t]he broad conduct will be the focus of the test unless the narrow conduct presents substantially different or heightened public policy concerns.” Id. at 730.

    The court in Stone concluded that the offenses concerned in that case — driving without a license or with an expired license, driving with an expired registration, failure to provide insurance or proof of insurance, speeding, and failure to use a seat belt or a child restraint seat — are all regulatory and thus not subject to Public Law 280. Id. at 730-31. The court reasoned that the purpose of the statutes creating these offenses is to further the state’s general interest in protecting “the safety of persons and property on the roadways,” which in the case of driver’s license requirements includes “ensuring the competency of drivers.” Id. at 730. Although the court noted that the statutes relating to insurance and vehicle registration also served other purposes, it concluded that these purposes were not sufficiently distinct from general road safety policies to separate the offenses from the broad conduct of driving for purposes of the Cabazon test. Id. at 731.

    The Stone court stated in dictum that the laws prohibiting driving while intoxicated and careless driving would present sufficient public policy concerns to be considered as “criminal” statutes because “then’ violation creates a greater risk of direct injury to persons and property on the roadways.” Id. See generally In re Estate of Bush, 302 Minn. 188, 207, 224 N.W.2d 489, 501 (1974) (stating that dicta are entitled to “considerable weight” if they contain “an expression of the opinion of the court”). In a companion case, the supreme court concluded that the statute prohibiting underage consumption of alcohol reflects public policy concerns sufficiently distinct from those underlying other laws regulating the consumption and sale of alcohol to permit its enforcement on reservation territory. State v. Robinson, 572 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Minn.1997). There is no other published caselaw applying the Stone test, but this court earlier upheld the enforcement of the state’s implied consent law on reservation land because “Minnesota does not seek merely to regulate driving while intoxicated: it categorically prohibits such driving.” Bray v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 555 N.W.2d 757, 760 (Minn.App.1996).

    It is within this framework that we consider the statutes at issue. Zornes was convicted of violating Minn.Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5 (Supp.1997), pursuant to which it is a gross misdemeanor to drive if one’s license has been cancelled on the ground provided by Minn.Stat. § 171.04, subd. 1(9) (1996). The Commissioner of Public Safety may cancel any driver’s license that could have been denied if applied for at the time of cancellation. Minn.Stat. § 171.14 (1996). Section 171.04, subdivision 1(9), allows the commissioner to deny a driver’s license to

    any person when the commissioner has good cause to believe that the operation of a motor vehicle on the highways by such person would be inimical to public safety or welfare.

    Although the phrase “inimical to public safety or welfare” is broad, the only grounds provided for cancellation in Minnesota’s administrative rules promulgated under section 171.04, subdivision 1(9), concern alcohol and controlled substances. See Minn. R. 7503.1300 (1997) (permitting cancellation for (1) failure to attend evaluation session or complete prescribed treatment or classes following alcohol- or substance-related incident, (2) a record of three alcohol- or drug-related incidents in five years, three incidents and a special review within ten years of the third incident, or four or more incidents altogether, or (3) consumption of drugs or alcohol after completing rehabilitation). Section 171.24, subdivision 5, thus serves a purpose distinct from the motor vehicle licensing laws’ general purpose of “ensuring the competency of drivers.” See Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 730. Under the supreme court’s dictum in Stone, driving while intoxicated gives rise to heightened policy concerns, and under Bray, the state may revoke a driver’s license under the implied consent law for conduct occurring on reservation territory. See id. at 731; Bray, 555 N.W.2d at 761. We agree with the state that Minnesota’s policies against driving while intoxicated are undermined if a license may be cancelled on the basis of DWI offenses that occurred on a reservation, but such a cancellation cannot be enforced on the reservation by imposing criminal penalties for subsequent driving.

    We therefore conclude that the state’s interest in enforcing its DWI laws presents policy concerns sufficiently different from general road safety to justify applying the Cabazon test to the narrow conduct of driving after a cancellation for public safety reasons rather than to the broad conduct of driving. We have little difficulty concluding that this conduct is not generally permitted. The statute unequivocally prohibits driving after the cancellation of a license and provides for no exceptions, as long as the driver has notice or reasonable cause to know of the cancellation. See Minn.Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5. The supreme court has identified several non-exhaustive factors that may be considered in close cases, and while we do not find this ease particularly close when the relevant conduct has been identified, we conclude that each of the factors, as the supreme court has applied them in other cases, supports a determination that the statute defining the offense of driving after cancellation as inimical to public safety is prohibitory rather than regulatory. See Robinson, 572 N.W.2d at 724 (finding that statute prohibiting underage drinking is criminal because it provides for only one affirmative defense and for misdemeanor penalties, violation requires “active participation rather than passive compliance or silent acquiescence,” and violation indirectly creates risk of injury). We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in determining that Public Law 280 grants the state jurisdiction over this offense when committed by a tribal member on reservation territory.

    DECISION

    The state has jurisdiction to enforce Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5, against a tribal member on reservation land. Because the jurisdiction issue is Zornes’s sole argument on appeal, we affirm his conviction.

    Affirmed.

    . The Red Lake reservation was not included in Public Law 280’s grant of authority, and the state later retroceded authority over the Nett Lake reservation.

    . An amendment, effective February 1, 1997, added a clause to Minn.Stat. § 171.04, subd. 1 (1996), resulting in the renumbering of other clauses and accompanying revision of the statutes that reference those clauses. The operative language remains the same as at the time of Zornes''s arrest.

    . Revocation of a license is mandatory under the implied consent law if testing shows an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more. Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 4(e) (Supp.1997). By contrast, section 171.14 grants the commissioner discretionary authority to cancel a license that would have been denied if applied for at the time of cancellation. See Minn.Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (1996) (stating that use of word "may" means act is permissive). We do not consider this difference to be significant for purposes of determining jurisdiction under Public Law 280 because the two statutes serve similar purposes.

    . We express no view as to whether Public Law 280 grants the state jurisdiction over any of the other offenses in section 171.24.'

  • 'STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. James Darrell GIBSON, Petitioner, Appellant.

    No. C1-91-1332.

    Supreme Court of Minnesota.

    Dec. 20, 1991.

    John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Mark F. Anderson, Asst. State Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.

    Scott A. Hersey, Isanti County Atty., Cambridge, and Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent.

    TOMLJANOVICH, Justice.

    In its decision in this case the court of appeals affirmed the use of multiple concurrent sentences for two offenses that defendant contends arose from a single behavioral incident. State v. Gibson, 475 N.W.2d 896 (Minn.App.1991). We agree with defendant and therefore vacate the lesser of the two sentences pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 609.035 (1990), the so-called single-behavioral-incident statute.

    The offenses of conviction here are criminal vehicular operation resulting in injury and felony leaving the scene of an accident, for which defendant received concurrent terms of 23 and 15 months. The first conviction is based on defendant’s involvement in a head-on collision while driving under the influence of alcohol. The second conviction is based on the fact that immediately after the accident, in which both defendant and the driver of the other vehicle were injured, defendant fled the scene on foot, went to a nearby farmhouse and called his girl friend to come and pick him up.

    Minnesota Statute § 609.035 provides in relevant part that if a person’s conduct “constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of such offenses.” The approach we have used in determining whether two nonintentional crimes or a nonintentional and an intentional crime are part of the same course of conduct is to analyze all the facts and determine whether the offenses “[arose] out of a continuing and uninterrupted course of conduct, manifesting an indivisible state of mind or coincident errors of judgment.” State v. Sailor, 257 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Minn.1977); see also State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 405, 141 N.W.2d 517, 525 (1966). When both crimes are intentional crimes we focus on factors such as time and place and whether the conduct involved was motivated by an effort to obtain but one criminal objective. State v. Johnson, supra.

    In a series of decisions — the avoidance-of-apprehension cases — we have held that multiple sentences may not be used for two offenses if the defendant, substantially contemporaneously committed the second offense in order to avoid apprehension for the first offense. State v. Gilbertson, 323 N.W.2d 810 (Minn.1982); State v. Zuehlke, 320 N.W.2d 79 (Minn.1982); State v. Boley, 299 N.W.2d 924 (Minn.1980); Matter of Castillo, 293 N.W.2d 839 (Minn.1980); State v. White, 292 N.W.2d 16 (Minn.1980); State v. Finn, 295 Minn. 520, 203 N.W.2d 114 (1972).

    Here the defendant committed the felonious act of leaving the scene of an accident in part to avoid being apprehended for any crime committed in connection with the accident. Accordingly, we vacate the lesser of the two sentences, the 15 month concur rent sentence for leaving the scene of an accident.

    Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

    . Closely related to the avoidance-of-apprehension cases are the facilitation-of-offense cases. See State v. Naylor, 474 N.W.2d 314 (Minn.1991); State v. Beito, 332 N.W.2d 645 (Minn.1983).' datasets:

• conceptofmind/test-minn pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity library_name: sentence-transformers

SentenceTransformer based on answerdotai/ModernBERT-base

This is a sentence-transformers model finetuned from answerdotai/ModernBERT-base on the test-minn dataset. It maps sentences & paragraphs to a 768-dimensional dense vector space and can be used for semantic textual similarity, semantic search, paraphrase mining, text classification, clustering, and more.

Model Details

Model Description

• Model Type: Sentence Transformer
• Base model: answerdotai/ModernBERT-base
• Maximum Sequence Length: 8192 tokens
• Output Dimensionality: 768 dimensions
• Similarity Function: Cosine Similarity
• Training Dataset:
  • test-minn

Model Sources

• Documentation: Sentence Transformers Documentation
• Repository: Sentence Transformers on GitHub
• Hugging Face: Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face

Full Model Architecture

SentenceTransformer(
  (0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 8192, 'do_lower_case': False}) with Transformer model: ModernBertModel 
  (1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 768, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': True, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
)

Usage

Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)

First install the Sentence Transformers library:

pip install -U sentence-transformers

Then you can load this model and run inference.

from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer

# Download from the 🤗 Hub
model = SentenceTransformer("conceptofmind/teraflop-minn-caselaw")
# Run inference
sentences = [
    'Minnesota court ruling on co-owned farm division',
    "ELLEN BRANDIN v. JASPER SWENSON.\nJune 19, 1925.\nNo 24,681.\n8. H. Écfanqn, for appellant.\nJohn Heitmarm, for respondent.\nReported in 204 N. W. 468.\n\nDibell, J.\nAction in St. Louis county to have the plaintiff adjudged to be the owner of an 80-acre tract of land, and, if such relief were denied, that the land be partitioned. There was judgment for a partition in specie, and the plaintiff appeals.\nThe evidence is not returned. The only question, as correctly stated by counsel for appellant, is whether the findings of fact justify the judgment; and in stating the facts we follow the findings of the trial court.\nA marriage ceremony' was performed between the plaintiff, Ellen Brandin, and the defendant, Jasper Swenson, on February 10, 1906. At that time the plaintiff had a husband living. He had deserted her 10 years before and she and the defendant supposed that he was dead. In 1920 it was ascertained that he was living; and on January 8, 1922, a judgment was entered annuling the marriage of the plaintiff and defendant.\nOn April 9, 1906, the plaintiff and the defendant purchased an 80-acre tract as tenants in common and the deed ran to both. The purchase price was paid by the plaintiff, but a part thereof the defendant had given her from his earnings subsequent to their formal marriage, and not long afterwards he gave her money exceeding his one-half of the purchase price. In 1907 the defendant moved upon the land and has since lived there and improved one forty. The plaintiff continued living in Duluth, operating a boarding house. She contributed to the improvement of the farm, and received cash and products from it. The court set off to her the west forty of the eighty, and to the defendant the east forty upon which he had made the improvements. This was done on the basis of its finding that the value of the west forty was to the value contributed by the plaintiff approximately as was the value-of the east forty to the amount contributed by the defendant. This was an equitable division. Each got one-half in area of the land. The defendant got'the forty upon which he had improved. Each got a value proportionate to contribution. The principles stated in Hunt v. Meeker County A. & L. Co. 135 Minn. 134, 160 N. W. 496, sustain the division. With the record as it is, neither the form of the pleadings nor the procedure adopted is important. No complaint is made of either.\nJudgment affirmed.",
    'STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. James Darrell GIBSON, Petitioner, Appellant.\nNo. C1-91-1332.\nSupreme Court of Minnesota.\nDec. 20, 1991.\nJohn M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Mark F. Anderson, Asst. State Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.\nScott A. Hersey, Isanti County Atty., Cambridge, and Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent.\n\nTOMLJANOVICH, Justice.\nIn its decision in this case the court of appeals affirmed the use of multiple concurrent sentences for two offenses that defendant contends arose from a single behavioral incident. State v. Gibson, 475 N.W.2d 896 (Minn.App.1991). We agree with defendant and therefore vacate the lesser of the two sentences pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 609.035 (1990), the so-called single-behavioral-incident statute.\nThe offenses of conviction here are criminal vehicular operation resulting in injury and felony leaving the scene of an accident, for which defendant received concurrent terms of 23 and 15 months. The first conviction is based on defendant’s involvement in a head-on collision while driving under the influence of alcohol. The second conviction is based on the fact that immediately after the accident, in which both defendant and the driver of the other vehicle were injured, defendant fled the scene on foot, went to a nearby farmhouse and called his girl friend to come and pick him up.\nMinnesota Statute § 609.035 provides in relevant part that if a person’s conduct “constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of such offenses.” The approach we have used in determining whether two nonintentional crimes or a nonintentional and an intentional crime are part of the same course of conduct is to analyze all the facts and determine whether the offenses “[arose] out of a continuing and uninterrupted course of conduct, manifesting an indivisible state of mind or coincident errors of judgment.” State v. Sailor, 257 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Minn.1977); see also State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 405, 141 N.W.2d 517, 525 (1966). When both crimes are intentional crimes we focus on factors such as time and place and whether the conduct involved was motivated by an effort to obtain but one criminal objective. State v. Johnson, supra.\nIn a series of decisions — the avoidance-of-apprehension cases — we have held that multiple sentences may not be used for two offenses if the defendant, substantially contemporaneously committed the second offense in order to avoid apprehension for the first offense. State v. Gilbertson, 323 N.W.2d 810 (Minn.1982); State v. Zuehlke, 320 N.W.2d 79 (Minn.1982); State v. Boley, 299 N.W.2d 924 (Minn.1980); Matter of Castillo, 293 N.W.2d 839 (Minn.1980); State v. White, 292 N.W.2d 16 (Minn.1980); State v. Finn, 295 Minn. 520, 203 N.W.2d 114 (1972).\nHere the defendant committed the felonious act of leaving the scene of an accident in part to avoid being apprehended for any crime committed in connection with the accident. Accordingly, we vacate the lesser of the two sentences, the 15 month concur rent sentence for leaving the scene of an accident.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part.\n. Closely related to the avoidance-of-apprehension cases are the facilitation-of-offense cases. See State v. Naylor, 474 N.W.2d 314 (Minn.1991); State v. Beito, 332 N.W.2d 645 (Minn.1983).',
]
embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
print(embeddings.shape)
# [3, 768]

# Get the similarity scores for the embeddings
similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
print(similarities.shape)
# [3, 3]

Training Details

Training Dataset

test-minn

• Dataset: test-minn at a383680
• Size: 248,554 training samples
• Columns: query and reponse
• Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

  	query	reponse
  type	string	string
  details	min: 4 tokens mean: 15.14 tokens max: 31 tokens	min: 119 tokens mean: 2706.53 tokens max: 8192 tokens

• Samples:

  query	reponse
  The role of seed-grain notes in property liens and collections	WINTER & AMES COMPANY v. ATLANTIC ELEVATOR COMPANY. January 9,1903. Nos. 13,155 — (140). Authority of Agent — Evidence. Evidence examined, and held sufficient to sustain .the findings of the trial court to the effect that an agent of plaintiff had authority to authorize the sale of certain flaxseed on which plaintiff held a lien by virtue of a seed-grain note, and to release the lien thus held. Action in the municipal court of Minneapolis to recover $250, and interest, for the conversion of certain flaxseed. The case was tried before Holt, J., who found in favor of defendant. From an order denying a motion for a new trial, plaintiff appealed. Affirmed. L. J. Van Fossen, for appellant. Wilson & Van Derlip, for respondent. Reported in 92 N. W. 955. BROWN, J. Action to recover the value of certain flaxseed alleged to have been converted by defendant, in which defendant had judgment in the court below, and plaintiff appeals from an order denying a new trial. The short facts are as follows...
  on priority disputes involving misdescribed mortgages and judgments?	Lucy H. Gill vs. William C. Russell, impleaded, etc. February 12, 1877. Exceptions where Evidence is Taken by Referee. — Upon the hearing of a case upon evidence taken and reported by a referee appointed for that purpose-alone, a party desiring to avail himself of any objection interposed before-the referee must renew it, and obtain a ruling thereon by the court, and, if adverse, take an exception. Estoppel — Director of Corporation Cannot Profit by Mistake in a Mortgage by the Company wbieb he Took Part in Making. — B., a corporation, duly executed to plaintiff a real estate mortgage, for valuable consideration, which, through mutual mistake of parties, misdescribed the premises intended and agreed to be mortgaged. Plaintiff caused the mortgage to bo duly recorded. It., one of the directors, who participated in the giving of the mortgage and in the mistake, afterwards obtained a judgment against the corporation, and duly docketed the same, so as to make it a lien upon the premises, be...
  On what grounds can neglect claims against railroads be challenged?	Iver Anderson vs. Southern Minnesota Railroad Company. Aug. 10, 1874. Waiver by Corporation of Defective Service of Sammons. — A corporation, after appearing generally and pleading to the merits in an action in a justice’s court, cannot afterwards object that the summons was not served in conformity with the requirements of statute. Justice of Peace — Adjournment—Docket Entry. — A docket entry, “by consent of parties, the case is adjourned till Monday, September 23, 1873, at one o’clock in the afternoon,” sufficiently complies with the statute requiring that the justice shall enter in his docket “every adjournment, stating to what time and place." This action was brought in a justice’s court, where the plaintiff had judgment. The defendant appealed, upon questions of law, to the district court for Fillmore county, Waterman, J., presiding, where the judgment of the justice was reversed, and judgment entered for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appeals. The case is stated in the o...

• Loss: CachedMultipleNegativesRankingLoss with these parameters:

  {
      "scale": 20.0,
      "similarity_fct": "cos_sim"
  }
  

Evaluation Dataset

test-minn

• Dataset: test-minn at a383680
• Size: 248,554 evaluation samples
• Columns: query and reponse
• Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

  	query	reponse
  type	string	string
  details	min: 3 tokens mean: 14.9 tokens max: 33 tokens	min: 131 tokens mean: 2599.64 tokens max: 8192 tokens

• Samples:

  query	reponse
  Legal definition of "foul brood" in fraudulent bee sales	C. E. SAMPSON v. F. C. PENNEY. February 17, 1922. No. 22,564. New trial because of lack of evidence to support verdict. 1. There is evidence that, in a sale of bees, all of the elements of fraud were present, if certain representations made were proven false. There is doubt as to whether the proof of falsity was sufficient. But a new trial must be granted on the ground that the evidence .fails to sustain the verdict as to.the amount of damages. Measure of damages, direct and consequential, from fraud in sale of diseased bees. 3. The direct damage for fraud which induces a contract, is the difference in value between what the party defrauded parted with and what he received. In addition to this, the party defrauded may recover consequential damages flowing naturally and proximately from, the 'breach. If -one through fraud procures a sale of animals afflicted with disease, the purchaser may recover for the loss of other animals of his own to Which the disease is communicated, but not for...
  What cases differentiate liability based on whether a thief was in flight?	ANNE WANNEBO v. ELNATHAN GATES AND ANOTHER. November 26, 1948. No. 34,713. Meagher, Geer & Markham and Clyde F. Anderson, for appellants. R. 8. hammers and Allan h. Johnson, for respondent. Reported in 34 N. W. (2d) 695. Magney, Justice. Defendants appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint herein, the question presented having been certified as important and doubtful. On July 2,1947, defendant Frances L. Gates parked a car owned by defendant Elnathan Gates on a public street in a business area in Minneapolis. She went shopping and left the car unattended and the doors and ignition unlocked. The key was not removed from the ignition switch and taken with her. The car was stolen. That night, át about 11:30, the stolen car) negligently operated by a person unknown, collided with plaintiff’s automobile, damaging the same and injuring plaintiff. The above facts state briefly the material allegations of the complaint to which defendants demur. A part of § 11 of an ordinanc...
  How does the relationship between the testator and beneficiaries affect claims of undue influence in Minnesota?	In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Gerald Charles ANDERSON, a.k.a. Gerald C. Anderson, Deceased. No. C5-85-871. Court of Appeals of Minnesota. Dec. 24, 1985. Review Denied Feb. 19, 1986. Richard A. Beens, Anoka, for appellant Mary Ann Reynolds. Rolf T. Nelson, Robbinsdale, for respondents Sally Ann Sellers, Carol Ann Young, Robert Charles Anderson and Carl Earl Anderson. Heard, considered and decided by HUS-PENI, P.J., and FOLEY and FORSBERG, JJ. OPINION HUSPENI, Judge. Mary Ann Reynolds, appellant and daughter of decedent Gerald Anderson, attempted to admit into probate a second codicil to decedent’s will. Respondents, who were decedent’s four other children, objected to the probate of this second codicil. An advisory jury found that the second codicil was executed as a result of undue influence exerted by Reynolds. The trial court adopted the advisory jury’s finding of undue influence. Reynolds appeals from the order denying probate of the second codicil and the trial court’s denial of ...

• Loss: CachedMultipleNegativesRankingLoss with these parameters:

  {
      "scale": 20.0,
      "similarity_fct": "cos_sim"
  }
  

Training Hyperparameters

Non-Default Hyperparameters

• eval_strategy: steps
• per_device_train_batch_size: 1024
• per_device_eval_batch_size: 1024
• learning_rate: 0.0003
• num_train_epochs: 1
• warmup_ratio: 0.1
• bf16: True
• batch_sampler: no_duplicates

All Hyperparameters

Training Logs

Framework Versions

• Python: 3.11.9
• Sentence Transformers: 3.4.1
• Transformers: 4.49.0
• PyTorch: 2.6.0+cu124
• Accelerate: 1.4.0
• Datasets: 3.3.2
• Tokenizers: 0.21.0

Citation

BibTeX

Sentence Transformers

@inproceedings{reimers-2019-sentence-bert,
    title = "Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks",
    author = "Reimers, Nils and Gurevych, Iryna",
    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing",
    month = "11",
    year = "2019",
    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
    url = "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10084",
}

CachedMultipleNegativesRankingLoss

@misc{gao2021scaling,
    title={Scaling Deep Contrastive Learning Batch Size under Memory Limited Setup},
    author={Luyu Gao and Yunyi Zhang and Jiawei Han and Jamie Callan},
    year={2021},
    eprint={2101.06983},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    primaryClass={cs.LG}
}